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ABSTRACT
As Rule 10b-5 approaches the age of seventy, deep familiarity with
this supremely potent and consequential provision of American
administrative law has obscured its lack of clear conceptual content.
The rule, as written, interpreted, and enforced, is missing a fully
developed connection to—of all things—fraud. Fraud is difficult to
define. Several approaches are plausible. But the law of securities
fraud, and much of the commentary about that body of law, has
neither attempted such a definition nor acknowledged its necessity to
the coherence and effectiveness of the doctrine.
Securities fraud’s lack of mooring in a fully developed concept of
fraud produces at least three costs: public and private actions are not
brought on behalf of clearly specified regulatory objectives; the line
between civil and criminal liability has become unacceptably blurred;
and the law has come to provide at best a weak means of resolving
vital public questions about wrongdoing in financial markets. The
agenda of this Article is threefold. First, this Article illuminates and
clarifies the relationship between securities fraud and fraud and
structures a discussion of legal reform that more explicitly connects
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securities fraud remedies with the purposes of a regime of securities
regulation. Second, it clarifies the line between civil and criminal
liability. And third, this Article seeks a better understanding of what is
being asked when legal actors and the public wonder whether to label
an important instance of market failure “fraud.”
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INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently
leveled a highly publicized enforcement action against the venerable
investment banking and securities firm, Goldman Sachs. When the
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suit was filed, the headlines blared, “U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs
1
with Fraud.” The theory of the case was that Goldman had sold a
German bank a derivative product tied to the fate of a basket of
mortgage-backed securities, while simultaneously obscuring the
weaknesses of the securities in that basket. According to the SEC,
Goldman obfuscated the matter by touting the role of a reputable
independent firm in the selection of the underlying securities and by
failing to disclose that a player who was betting against the securities
2
was also allowed to participate in the selection process.
A lively public discussion followed about whether Goldman,
widely tagged as a symbol of bubble-era greed, was also crooked. Did
the Goldman bankers deserve condemnation for purposely exploiting
the naïveté of investors, so they could profit from the sale of products
3
that were bets on a market Goldman knew was bound to crash?
Although the transaction involved in the SEC’s lawsuit was small by
Goldman’s standards, its structure implicated big questions about the
culpability of global banks for inflating a market in mortgage-derived
4
securities that was practically designed to self-destruct.
1. E.g., Francesco Guerrera & Henny Sender, Goldman Sachs Splash, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2010, at 1; Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in
Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at A1; Gregory Zuckerman, Susanne Craig & Serena
Ng, U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at A1.
2. Complaint at 7–11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,
2010).
3. See, e.g., Editorial, After Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A28 (characterizing
Goldman’s conduct as gambling on the market); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Looters in Loafers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at A23 (“[N]ow the S.E.C. is charging that Goldman created and
marketed securities that were deliberately designed to fail, so that an important client could
make money off that failure. That’s what I would call looting.”); John Carney, Goldman Sachs
Girds for Battle with the SEC over Fraud Case, CNBC.COM (May 26, 2010, 4:00 PM ET), http://
www.cnbc.com/id/37362236/Goldman_Sachs_Girds_for_Battle_With_the_SEC_Over_Fraud_
Case (“A sticking point for Goldman is the SEC’s fraud allegations. The company is unwilling
to agree to any settlement that would have the appearance of affirming that Goldman
committed fraud, a person familiar with the matter says. However, Goldman might be willing to
settle a case alleging that Goldman was only negligent in omitting a material fact in marketing
the deal, the person said.”); Abigail Field, Deconstructing Goldman Sachs’s Fraud Defense,
DAILY FIN. (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing/deconstruct
ing-goldman-sachss-fraud-defense/19444284 (evaluating the merits of the SEC’s complaint and
Goldman’s defense); Tom Granahan, In Defense of Goldman Sachs, FOX BUS. (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/04/21/defense-goldman-sachs (questioning whether
Goldman’s sale of assets should really be labeled fraudulent solely because a third party
believed the assets were weak).
4. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE
THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 6–10, 14–15 (2010) (“All these subprime lending companies were
growing so rapidly, and using such goofy accounting, that they could mask the fact that they had
no real earnings, just illusory, accounting-driven, ones.”).
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Did Goldman commit fraud? This seems like an important
5
question to answer. Indeed, given that the damages at issue in the
6
suit were unlikely to threaten Goldman seriously, this enforcement
action seems to have served no greater public purpose than letting the
public know whether Goldman committed fraud—thereby informing
the public what such an institution is capable of and instructing other
institutions and their managers about what is expected of them. But
the public never got an answer to this question.
A large part of the explanation for this lacuna lies in the
procedural habits and economics of SEC enforcement actions. As did
the Goldman case, these actions almost all settle without a trial, and
almost always with the alleged perpetrator of fraud “neither
7
admit[ting] nor deny[ing]” the SEC’s claims. Because the facts of the
Goldman case were never developed with any granularity—and
because Goldman admitted nothing—the great case of “U.S. Charges
Goldman Sachs with Fraud” simply evaporated, leaving hardly a trace
8
beyond the $550 million fine that swelled the SEC’s coffers.
5. Debate about the nature of Goldman’s responsibility for the cataclysm that stemmed
from the mortgage-related securities market rages on. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY
AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE THE WORLD 1–24 (2011) (“There is little
doubt that Goldman’s dual decisions to establish ‘the big short’ and then to write down the
value of its mortgage portfolio exacerbated the misery at other firms.”); Louis Story & Gretchen
Morgenson, S.E.C. Case Stands Out Because It Stands Alone, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2011, at A1
(“How Mr. Tourre alone came to be the face of mortgage-securities fraud has raised questions
among former prosecutors and Congressional officials about how aggressive and thorough the
government’s investigations have been into Wall Street’s role in the mortgage crisis.”); Matt
Taibbi, The People v. Goldman Sachs, ROLLING STONE, May 26, 2011, at 41 (“[T]he mountain
of evidence collected against Goldman by . . . investigators—details of gross, baldfaced fraud
delivered up in such quantities as to almost serve as a kind of sarcastic challenge to the curiously
impassive Justice Department—stands as the most important symbol of Wall Street’s
aristocratic impunity and prosecutorial immunity produced since the crash of 2008.”).
6. Goldman’s reported revenues for 2010 were $39.16 billion. Press Release, Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc., Goldman Sachs Reports Earnings per Common Share of $13.18 for 2010, at 1
(Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/
current/pdfs/2010-q4-earnings.pdf.
7. Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE
CONDUCT 87, 89 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). I will not repeat here my
complaints about the deficit of this process.
8. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 1–2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (stating, “[w]ithout admitting or denying the
allegations of the complaint,” that Goldman “regret[ted]” making incomplete disclosures in its
marketing materials); Sewell Chan & Louise Story, Goldman Pays $550 Million To Settle Fraud
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A1; Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs To Pay Record
$550 Million To Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Market CDO (July 15, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
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But the reason that the question of fraud in the Goldman case
went unanswered goes much deeper. Even if the case had been tried
to a verdict, a clear answer still might not have emerged. This
uncertainty is the fault not of the SEC but of the law of securities
fraud, which does not require the question of whether fraud was
committed to be asked in the first place.
The law allows a case like the one against Goldman to be alleged
and argued as securities fraud even if the seller merely failed to
exercise due care as to whether the buyer was misled about the nature
9
of the securities being sold or how those securities were selected. The
law further permits a claim of fraud—even when brought by a private
litigant—to be founded on an allegation of recklessness and allows
the litigant to assert, in essence, gross negligence as to whether the
buyer was misled. If one takes the federal appellate decisions on the
issue at face value, the law would appear to support a criminal
conviction in a case like Goldman’s even if the seller were merely
10
reckless. Finally, the law leaves unsettled questions about when and
how special relationships can render certain conduct fraudulent that
11
would not be so in other contexts.
Doctrinally, the problem includes opacity on questions of duty
and fuzziness—as well as excessive permissiveness—with respect to
rules of fault. These doctrinal failings, in turn, connect to the deeper
question of whether the law of securities fraud is necessarily tethered
to the concept of fraud.
If one believes that fraud is a morally charged concept that
requires that an actor seek to deceive another, then two commitments
follow. First, no such thing as no-fault fraud, negligent fraud, or
arguably even reckless fraud can exist. And second, any liability
inquiry must consider both the actor’s degree of fault with respect to
the falsity of her representation or the tendency of her conduct to
mislead and her objective in making the relevant representation or

9. See infra text accompanying notes 120–41. Though it is not a securities fraud case, the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) pending civil case under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–3733 (2006), against Deutsche Bank related to the collapse of the mortgage market—an
enforcement action that likewise fetched substantial headlines—raises the same concerns. The
complaint is full of allegations that Deutsche Bank repeatedly lied about what it was doing in
the mortgage market, but the legal theories are based on claims of negligence and gross
negligence. Complaint at 1, 40–47, United States v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 11 Civ. 2976
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2011).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 154–74.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19.
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engaging in the relevant conduct. According to this way of thinking,
fraud is a particular instance of wrongdoing, like murder or slander,
for which a particular kind of responsibility attaches to the
transgressor.
If, however, one believes that fraud is a victim-centered concept
having to do with harm suffered at the hands of an actor whose words
or conduct misled another, then fewer commitments follow. Fraud
may be based on negligent statements or conduct, or perhaps even on
duly careful but nonetheless harmful statements or conduct. No
inquiry into an actor’s intentions is required. According to this line of
thought, fraud is more like a category of legal actions, such as
homicide or property-related torts. Liability may be triggered without
necessarily imputing moral responsibility.
Many bodies of law have proceeded down one or the other of
12
these paths in dealing with the ancient legal idea of fraud. But the
law of securities fraud has tried to have it both ways.
This field of law speaks and acts as if it endorses the first view. It
deploys not only private remedies but also public sanctions of both a
civil and a criminal nature, including fines, imprisonment, and forms
13
of debarment. Furthermore, the legislative and administrative
history and judicial interpretations of securities fraud provisions, as
well as the rhetoric of public officials who enforce the securities laws,
assert that the law of securities fraud polices cheating and venality in
14
markets.
At the same time, the statutes, rules, and doctrine of securities
fraud endorse the second view of fraud. They permit virtually all of
the available sanctions to be levied based on negligent or, at most,
tortiously reckless conduct. They at times require intent, but dilute its
meaning to such an extent that it is no longer recognizable. And they

12. Compare, e.g., United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that
“proof of fraudulent intent is critical” in criminal prosecutions for mail fraud), with, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (providing that misstatement-inducing
assent voids a contract if it is either fraudulent or material).
13. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21B, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2, 78ff (2006) (setting
forth the civil and criminal penalties for SEC violations); Dearlove v. SEC, 573 F.3d 801, 837
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that an accountant’s unreasonable conduct during an audit of financial
statements warranted debarment from SEC practice).
14. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Friendly, J.) (identifying the purpose of securities regulation as preventing deception and
trickery); Recent Press Releases, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/news/press.shtml (last modified Nov.
10, 2011) (announcing various prosecutions brought by the SEC against people who had gained
an unfair advantage in the market through deception or insider knowledge).
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cling jealously to a vague genesis story about securities fraud’s origins
in common-law fraud—a story that connects to both law and equity
jurisdiction and that represents perhaps the most flexible and
permissive account of the legal idea of fraud.
This duality and, at times, incoherence about the purpose and
essence of the law of securities fraud undermines the public interest
in at least three ways. First, a massive sanctioning machinery is
mobilized without any commitment from the legal system about
which among three possible aims that apparatus is meant to serve:
forcing disclosure, improving accuracy in disclosure, or deterring lying
and cheating. How can an observer know whether a liability system is
producing anything approaching optimal outcomes when the system
has not identified the objectives against which to measure
15
outcomes? Surprisingly, the leading contemporary literature on
securities fraud focuses heavily on outcome optimality—chiefly, from
empirical and institutional-design perspectives—without exploring
16
the question of what securities fraud is.
Second, the law of securities fraud does not conduct the inquiry
that the public debate about financial wrongdoing appears to
demand. When the body politic fulminates over a case like
Goldman’s, it may be solely concerned with harm and loss: “Curse
those greedy bankers. They ought to be made to pay when the little

15. See Joseph Raz, Responsibility and the Negligence Standard 15–16 (Columbia Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 09-207, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1436022 (arguing that efficiency cannot be measured without first settling
normative questions).
16. See, e.g., Lynn Bai, James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Lying and Getting Caught: An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1877, 1912–14 (2010) (studying the effects of class action settlements on the
operating efficiency of firms); Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
35, 35–37 (2009) (considering whether the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18
U.S.C.), successfully screens frivolous claims); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities
Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1538
(2006) (arguing that to deter securities fraud most effectively, significant financial damages
should be imposed on the culpable actors, not, for example, on innocent shareholders); Amanda
M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (suggesting that the power to enforce the securities fraud
provisions be consolidated in the SEC).
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17

guy suffers from their craven profligacy.” Such sentiment is present
18
in the discussion, to be sure.
But people are also up in arms over whether the big guys did
something more grievous than making a bumbling hash of the
markets at the public’s expense. When the government introduces the
idea of fraud into the discussion, the public wants to know whether
there was something like purposeful deception on Goldman’s part.
Such a culpable purpose was strongly implied in the SEC’s
condemnatory recitation of the facts in its complaint against
Goldman. But it was not a purpose to which the SEC had to commit
as a matter of pleading, nor would the SEC have been required to
prove it to secure a jury verdict or an appellate victory.
One could take the position that political discourse about
wrongdoing in financial markets is an entirely separate matter from
the law of securities fraud and the professionalized processes of its
enforcement and adjudication. But that would require ignoring
evidence that messages, perception, and individual cases have a
19
significant influence on the behavior of managers and forgetting the
mantra that maintenance of elusive “investor confidence” is a prime
20
function of regulation in this context.
Securities fraud is probably underenforced, even if it may be
oversanctioned in some cases. Because enforcement resources are

17. Of course, only systemically speaking were “little guys” victimized in the Goldman
case. In the transaction itself, the allegedly defrauded buyer was no little guy.
18. Even relatively informed participants in the public discussion can display tendencies in
this direction. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pulling Back the Curtain on Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2010, at B1 (speculating on why the Obama Justice Department has pursued small
fraudsters in large numbers but has left the leaders of large firms largely unmolested in recent
criminal inquiries, but failing to consider the possibility that prosecutors may lack sufficient
evidence of criminal guilt to prove such cases). For a taste of the large dollop of which I speak,
one need only peruse the online comments posted in response to a column such as Sorkin’s. See
Readers’ Comments: Pulling Back the Curtain on Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, http://
community.nytimes.com/comments/dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/pulling-back-the-curtainon-fraud-inquiries/?sort=oldest (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). Another such source is Charles
Ferguson’s Oscar-winning film, INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010).
19. See Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 361 (2010) (“We
find that organizations are more likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate
when they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy regulatory surveillance and when they
adopt self-regulation in the absence of an explicit threat of sanctions.”).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (“Among Congress’ objectives in
passing the Act was ‘to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence’ after the market crash of 1929.” (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
658 (1997))).
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limited, public awareness of enforcement is at least as important as
the price that enforcement imposes. When the law of securities fraud
fails to generate juridical processes that instruct the public on who
deserves blame and why, it wastes a valuable resource.
Third, as a regime imposing civil and criminal liability, the law of
securities fraud is obligated by principles of legality and fairness—not
to mention efficiency—to choose one of two positions. Either the law
of securities fraud endorses a near complete overlap between civil
and criminal liability, making criminal sanctions available for any
form of compensable conduct—in which case it would be an anomaly
among Anglo-American legal regimes—or, more plausibly, it reserves
criminal sanctions for serious forms of wrongdoing—in which case it
would need to specify the conditions of fault and harm that make
imprisonment and other forms of criminal punishment available. The
law of securities fraud’s failure to commit to a theory of fraud is at the
root of its failure to be clear about what conduct triggers criminal
liability.
The motivation for this Article is the belief that illuminating the
relationship between securities fraud and the concept of fraud can
ameliorate the three problems just described, all of which are located
in both the law of securities fraud and the public discourse about
market-based fraud. Some theoretical backfilling is required to
stabilize this potent but aging body of law. After this groundwork is
laid, one can see a compelling case for several accessible reforms:
redrafting the statutes and rules governing securities fraud to
distinguish causes of action for core fraud from those for
misrepresentation and to differentiate claims of criminal fault from
those of civil liability; and, in the absence of such rewriting, improving
judicial decisions in the field of securities fraud to clarify those same
distinctions.
In Part I, I explore options for defining the concept of fraud and
identify the choices one makes when selecting among those options,
with a particular focus on the crucial role of mental state in fraud. In
21
Part II, I detail the causes of action available under Rule 10b-5 and
related provisions and compare them to conceptions of fraud,
concluding that the idea of securities fraud remains undefined. In Part
III, I identify the normative stakes of failing to clarify and strengthen
the connection between fraud and securities fraud. I also suggest

21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
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avenues for reforming the law and improving public discourse about
fraud in financial markets.
I. WHAT IS FRAUD?
To examine the relationship between securities fraud and fraud,
it is necessary to start with the concept of fraud. In this Part, I begin
by explaining why fraud, like many ambitious legal concepts, is
difficult to nail down. Fortunately, a complete understanding of the
concept is not required here. To understand the law of securities
fraud, one need only understand several axes along which one might
define fraud. I begin this Part by setting forth those axes. I then turn
to explaining the role of mental state in fraud, as mental state is the
primary vehicle by which legal doctrine animates a particular
conception of fraud. Then, in Part II, I demonstrate how the law of
securities fraud relies on multiple, conflicting, and incomplete
conceptions of fraud.
A. The Question Is Hard and Important
How should one define the sociolegal concept of fraud? This
question is hard because, as I explore elsewhere in greater detail,
fraud is a legal concept designed to adapt alongside the evolving
22
behaviors that it targets. Fraud can have fixed meaning only at a
very general level. If one attempts to key one’s definition of fraud to
descriptions of behaviors, new behaviors will inevitably be invented,
or will simply arise, that expose the definition as faulty and
underinclusive. This need for flexibility in the definition of fraud
arises because fraud involves a category of human wrongdoing that is
characterized by inventiveness and that is often situated within realms
of economics, technology, and industry that are sites of rapid social
and economic development.
The social realities of fraud thus exert great pressure on legal
regimes to address fraud with open-textured rules that are vulnerable
to complaints of intolerable vagueness. Fraud is somewhat like

22. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2006)
(“Instability in the law of fraud is structural.”). Many judicial formulations of this idea exist, and
they can be found going back several centuries. A perhaps extreme, but not atypical, version is
the following: “Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite and taking on protean form
at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard and fast definition, their
jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at once by new schemes beyond the definition.”
Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913).
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negligence in that it is designed to be an all-encompassing concept of
wrong that a common-law system of adjudication can deploy as
needed and define as it goes along, addressing cases ex post. But
fraud is a morally richer concept than negligence, with greater
normative ambitions. Fraud is in the business of condemnation and
punishment, not just compensation. As such, fraud cannot easily
justify ex ante vagueness, with large gaps to be filled in terms of
specific behaviors entirely ex post.
One needs a definition of fraud that strikes an acceptable
balance between social demands and inexorable human advancement
on the one hand and liberty interests on the other. If too restrictive a
definition is adopted, one quickly runs into cases that are obviously
fraud but that are not included. If too loose a definition is adopted,
one has no good answer to the defendant who asserts unfair surprise
at the imposition of a sanction. Erring in either direction is likely to
undermine the credibility of fraud law. If the law fails to punish
actions that resonate publicly as frauds, the law and its enforcers will
be condemned for being toothless in the face of innovative predation.
If the law does not appear to make principled distinctions or to
display predictability with respect to the persons it chooses to
sanction for fraud, then the project of regulating fraud will lose moral
valence, ceasing to be about condemning those who deserve it and
instead becoming a vehicle for parochial agendas—political,
economic, or otherwise.
This difficult conceptual and definitional problem is important
because fraud is employed so widely in the regulatory system and
referenced so frequently in the public discourse. Fraud is among the
most serious, costly, stigmatizing, and punitive forms of liability
23
imposed on actors in modern corporations and financial markets. Its
reach extends across all state and federal jurisdictions, over virtually
all forms of civil and criminal sanctions, and into nearly every realm
of financial engineering and economic exchange. If the legal system
cannot be clear on what fraud is, then policymakers and the general
public are not likely to get very far in understanding what of legal

23. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Legal Penalties for
Financial Misrepresentation 8 (May 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=933333 (“When criminal fraud or intent is suspected, the SEC can refer the
matter to the DOJ for parallel criminal prosecution. Criminal penalties include fines and various
forms of probation or incarceration . . . .”).
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significance has happened when something goes wrong in the
markets, much less in knowing what to do about it.
A good conception of fraud therefore must satisfy three general
conditions: sufficient flexibility for the law to adapt to changes in
behavior by primary actors, sufficient clarity for the law to satisfy
requirements of notice and guidance of discretion by legal actors, and
sufficient content for the law to inform the public of the nature of the
wrongdoing involved when an actor is held liable for fraud.
B. Some Axes of Fraud
Several approaches to the definitional problem are possible. A
useful strategy is to consider six axes with which the concept of fraud
24
intersects. A reasonably complete and functional conception of
fraud requires addressing most or all of these six axes:
(a) Act: Fraud might be limited to false representations—
whether made directly or by a partial representation that is
misleading due to omission. Alternatively, fraud might include
instances of nondisclosure and conduct that have misleading effects.
For example, one might falsely state that a product is free of any
25
defects. Or one might fail to disclose a known defect.
(b) Fault: Fraud might require a deceitful perpetrator who acts
intentionally and with knowledge of the tendency of her words or
conduct to mislead—perhaps ordinary knowledge, or possibly a
relaxed form that relies on willful blindness or some form of
recklessness. Alternatively, fraud might include instances in which an
actor simply causes another to be misled—grossly negligently,
negligently, or even in spite of due care. For example, a seller might
set out to induce an undecided buyer to purchase her product by
falsely stating that it is free of a defect. Or a seller might answer the
buyer’s question about whether the product is free of defect in the
affirmative, without having examined the product in a manner that
would have revealed a defect.
24. Regrettably, there being six of them, graphic representation of these axes is beyond my
competence.
25. Fraud can be committed through a true statement that is misleading because it omits
additional facts that are necessary to make those facts that are uttered not misleading (fraud by
partial omission). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1976). Fraud can be committed by
silence (fraud by complete omission or by nondisclosure). W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS,
ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106,
at 736–37 (5th ed. 1984). Or fraud can be committed by action rather than by utterance or
representation (fraud by conduct). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b.
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(c) Context: Fraud might differ depending on the type of
relationship in which it is committed. Actors with fiduciary and
similar duties might be responsible for fraud in a greater diversity of
situations and under more relaxed conditions than actors in arm’slength transactions. For example, a seller might decide to induce an
undecided buyer to purchase her product by failing to disclose a
known defect in an arm’s-length transaction in an ordinary market.
Or a seller might do the same thing in a relationship that carries
greater duties of the seller and higher expectations by the buyer than
in ordinary dealing.
(d) Sanction: Fraud might be a vehicle for imposing monetary
sanctions only, perhaps limited to forms of tort and contract damages.
Alternatively, it might be a means of effecting equitable remedies or
of imposing punishment. For example, if one deliberately
misrepresents the finances of a public company, one might be
required to pay damages to harmed shareholders. Or one might be
enjoined from managing a public company or required to serve a
term of imprisonment.
(e) Harm: Fraud might require the intrusion on—or deprivation
of—an economic interest of a measurable sort. Alternatively, it might
extend to deprivations of other kinds of interests, like choosing
whether to rely upon a particular expert versus another, or whether to
engage in certain kinds of social relations with other persons. For
example, one might falsely represent one’s wealth to induce a person
to trust one to invest that person’s savings. One might falsely
represent one’s expertise to gain another’s trust in the provision of
health care. Or one might falsely represent one’s wealth to induce a
person to commence a romantic relationship.
(f) Sector: Fraud might be limited to private dealings of an
economic nature. Alternatively, it might include conduct in the public
sector involving deception by public officials vis-à-vis their
constituents, or by citizens vis-à-vis government functions. For
example, an officeholder might falsely represent the origin of
campaign funds to induce voters to reelect her. Or a person might
fabricate documents to induce the government to abandon an
investigation that could implicate her in a violation of the law.
These are axes, not binary choices; a particular conception of
fraud might locate itself at various points along each axis. The more a
conception of fraud positions itself toward the broader, more
permissive, more capacious extremes on these axes, however, the less
fraud is a responsibility concept, used to identify actors who have
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wrongfully violated the rights of others or who have committed public
wrongs. Located on these ends of the axes, fraud is more of a label for
a situation in which the law compensates persons, shifts losses, or
prices certain conduct.
The most expansive conception of fraud would cover conduct
and omissions as well as statements; encompass all acts that mislead,
including negligent and even careful ones; impose further obligations
of disclosure and care on actors in special relationships; permit all
forms of sanctioning, civil and criminal; extend to deprivations of
noneconomic as well as economic interests; and apply to a variety of
interactions between individuals and the government in the realm of
26
public and political functions.

26. I will not deal here with two other avenues for conceiving of fraud. The first avenue
would be to explore fraud as a social construct by studying public opinion about fraud through
survey and interview work, perhaps coupled with an examination of discourse about fraud in the
popular media. For examples of this approach, see Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill &
Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of
Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 313–22 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science
in Criminal Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 417–21 (1998); and Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1108–15
(1998). To get a sense of the debate about this methodology, see Donald Braman, Dan M.
Kahan & David Hoffman, Reply, A Core of Agreement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 1655–60
(2010); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment
Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1532–38 (2010); and Paul H. Robinson, Owen D. Jones &
Robert Kurzban, Response, Realism, Punishment, and Reform, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611, 1611–
15 (2010). The second avenue would be to describe fraud in terms of outcomes produced by
actors in the legal system and the incentives that operate on those legal actors. William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506–11, 517–19, 546–
49 (2001). For example, fraud might turn out to be large financial losses caused by persons who
lack sufficient power in the political economy to convince legislators and enforcers to steer
sanctions away from them. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A
Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 97–98 (2004) (“Overall, my analysis suggests
that most of the important players, including many corporations and management, have reasons
to support some corporate crime legislation. This is because it helps to avoid or mitigate
legislative and judicial alternatives—such as new forms of corporate civil liability and
managerial criminal liability—that would be even more costly to corporate interests.” (emphasis
omitted)). Or, in a perhaps contradictory finding, fraud might be defined so as to allow
sanctions against those individuals whose punishment would yield the greatest career benefits
for enforcers. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, What Do
Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 259, 261 (2000) (noting that prosecutors might prosecute high-profile individuals to further
their own careers); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607 n.78 (2005)
(“There is some evidence that federal prosecutors do pursue such career goals in their case
selection decisions.”).
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As I show in Part II, the law of securities fraud has done a poor
job of coherently locating itself on these axes. In terms of its rhetoric,
its purposes, and its function in the regulatory state, this body of law
appears to be based on a conception of fraud as a particular and
meaningful form of wrongful conduct. But in terms of its text and its
doctrine, it has consistently gravitated toward the expansive end of
five of the six axes. The exception is the public-private sector axis,
27
axis (f). In securities regulation, the public-private problem is not
relevant: the government and its agents can be neither perpetrators
nor victims of securities fraud.
Before dealing with the law of securities fraud, however, it is
necessary to examine in considerable depth the matter of fault, axis
(b), which both intersects all of the other axes and eclipses them in
importance. Mental state, or the lack thereof, is the primary territory
in which the law of fraud animates one conception of fraud or
another. The significance of mental state in fraud must be understood
28
with some precision.

27. Public fraud has been a subject of intense controversy in other areas of federal fraud
regulation. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352–61 (1987) (reversing a mail
fraud conviction because the statute did not proscribe defrauding the public of its right to an
honest government); United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the federal honest-services mail fraud statute does not require that the conduct at issue also
violate an applicable state law), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); United States v. Margiotta, 688
F.2d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the conviction of a political leader for mail fraud
predicated upon a breach of fiduciary duty to the community, although the political leader had
held no official public office); Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States,
68 YALE L.J. 405, 417 (1959) (“A detailed examination of the cases dealing with [the federal
crime of conspiracy’s requirement that a defendant] ‘defraud the United States’ will reveal
that . . . . [t]he phrase has no fixed meaning. Instead, it has acquired a series of meanings—some
supplanting prior ones, others existing concurrently.” (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30,
14 Stat. 471, 484)). The question of what kinds of offender objectives and victim interests mark
out the boundary of fraud is implicated in the recent controversy over the federal honestservices fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896,
2931–34 (2010) (holding that the honest-services statute is limited to bribery and kickbacks);
Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 31–33 (2010)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to conceptually develop its fraud jurisprudence in three
mail fraud cases from the October 2009 Term).
28. Others have criticized the state of the law establishing the mental states required to
impose liability for securities fraud. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required
for a Criminal Violation of the Federal Securities Laws?, 52 BUS. LAW. 35 (1996); Elaine E.
Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts To Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977); James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A
Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977); Louis Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 BUS.
LAW. 147 (1976); Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667 (1991);
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C. Mental State and Fraud
1. Core Fraud Versus Misrepresentation. At a general level, the
centrality of mental state to any conception of fraud is easy to see.
Consider the following two stylized accounts, which I will resist giving
labels because each can potentially accommodate multiple schools of
thought and modes of legal regulation.
Account A: Fraud is a morally wrongful act that one person does
to another. It is best conceived as requiring purposeful deception.
Deception is required because fraud is not robbery, theft, battery,
burglary, extortion, or any number of other forms of wrongdoing that
one might characterize as more core than fraud. Fraud is the indirect
means of accomplishing what cannot be done directly. The idea is to
cause a victim to do or to relinquish something voluntarily that the
victim otherwise would not do or relinquish but for being subject to a
misapprehension at the hands of the violator—as opposed to being
subject to the violator’s exercise of force or coercion.
Fraud is a fairly modern concept, the product of social evolution
in two directions: toward greater societal recognition of an
individual’s entitlement to integrity of property and similar personal
interests, and toward greater individual appreciation that society will
not tolerate the appropriation of others’ interests by violence or its
equivalent. Laws and norms against the use of force and coercion
begat schemes to defraud. Such schemes begat laws and norms
against fraud. Antifraud law and its enforcement begat new
29
technologies of fraud. And on it goes.
In this account, purpose is necessary to the concept of fraud
because the better definition of deception requires that the actor
30
intend to deceive the other party. Although some commentators
William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121 (1997); Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179 (1986);
Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes:
The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025; Michael L. Seigel,
Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
1563; John L. Ruppert, Note, The Supreme Court’s Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The
Cultivation of a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CORP. L. 112 (1977). None of these works
has developed a comprehensive analysis of the concepts of fraud and securities fraud as routes
to rethinking and reforming the doctrine across the fields of criminal, regulatory, and private
civil liability.
29. This phenomenon is discussed at greater length in Buell, supra note 22, at 1977–96.
30. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 76–79 (2006); James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and
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have argued that deception can occur even when one unwittingly
causes another to labor under a misapprehension, this view makes
31
deception a less descriptive and meaningful term. Although I have
no evidence on the point, I believe that the alternative view also
corresponds less well to common usage of the term.
To speak untruth is to lie. Most agree that the best definition of
32
lying excludes the unwitting utterance of falsehoods. To deceive is to
do more than lie. Deception is more morally serious than lying
because it involves, through words or conduct, the willed alteration of
33
another’s mental processes : “‘[D]eceive’ is a success or an
34
achievement verb.” All else being equal, a deception intrudes more
seriously on the autonomy of another person than does a lie. Purpose
is therefore necessary to give the concept of deception the moral
content it ought to have. If fraud requires deception and deception
requires purpose, then fraud requires purpose.
Of course, purposeful deception is not sufficient to define
wrongful conduct as fraud. One who went around purposefully
deceiving, just for the sake or pleasure of producing such states of
mind, would not be called a fraudster, even if she were seen to be a
35
pathological liar and therefore morally at fault. In the case of fraud,
the deception is in service of a goal. Without such a goal having
formed in the mind of the actor, no fraud exists.
36
Account B: Fraud is a problem of costs and efficiency or, at
most, one of a damaged victim who is entitled to legal redress and to

Deception, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Feb. 21, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
lying-definition.
31. Mahon, supra note 30.
32. Id.; see also John Morris, Can Computers Ever Lie?, 14 PHIL. F. 389, 390 (1976) (“When
we say that someone tells a lie, we mean at least this: that he asserts something, claiming
(implicitly or explicitly) that it is true, and thereby pledging his own faith in its truth; that, in
fact, he believes that it is untrue; and finally that he hopes that his listener will be deceived by
what he says, and believe that it is true.”).
33. See James Edwin Mahon, A Definition of Deceiving, 21 INT’L J. APPLIED PHIL. 181, 181
(2007) (“Whether or not an act of lying has occurred does not depend on whether or not a
particular effect—for example, the belief that what the liar says is true—has been produced in
another . . . .”).
34. Id. at 190.
35. See Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan, The Intent To Deceive, 74 J. PHIL.
143, 146–48, 159 (1977) (distinguishing between lying, which is “the endeavor to add to
someone’s stock of false beliefs,” and bad faith, which is “the endeavor to subtract from
someone’s stock of true beliefs”).
36. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 137–38 (1979).
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37

be made whole. The most important question is not what the
relevant actor thought and did, but rather what happened to the
person who lost on the exchange. Purposeful deception is not
required. The actor need merely have caused a loss in a particular
way: the victim suffered a loss as a result of entertaining a
misapprehension due to something the actor did, expressed, or failed
to express.
This conception of fraud involves something more than “costs
that could have been avoided more efficiently by the actor whose
conduct caused the loss.” Such a definition would not distinguish
fraud from a broader concept like tort. The costs must result from the
victim’s having been misled. Fraud is a special kind of actionable
causation of loss having to do with persons suffering harm after being
38
misled by others. This legal device is justified, on this account, by
welfare considerations such as the costs associated with defensive
measures, market exit, and other likely behavioral responses in
environments in which fraud is not sanctioned. Alternatively,
justifications sounding in corrective justice have to do with
interference with an individual’s entitlement to make choices free of
39
misinformation under certain circumstances.
*

*

*

Cases akin to Account A undoubtedly constitute fraud.
Although the law has sometimes used the term misrepresentation to
40
describe cases based on Account B, these cases have, on other
37. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 530 (2005) (“[N]otwithstanding
the dominant tendency among modern scholars to treat tort law as an instrument for attaining
public goals such as loss-spreading or efficient precaution-taking, it is still best understood as a
law of redress.”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917, 918 (2010) (asserting that tort law is focused on “wrongs and recourse” rather than on
the allocation of accident costs).
38. Note that a view in the style of Account B need not entail limiting fraud law to civil
remedies. Criminal liability, unlike under federal fraud law, could require proof of harm to a
victim. Or criminal liability could attach upon proof of a conspiracy or an attempt or scheme to
impose certain types of loss or gain.
39. See John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2006) (“[T]he core of the legal wrong that has
historically been labeled ‘fraud’ or ‘deceit’ is the wrong of interfering with a particular interest
of the victim, namely her interest in making certain kinds of choices in certain settings free from
certain forms of misinformation.”).
40. See, e.g., Quail Hill, LLC v. Cnty. of Richland, 692 S.E.2d 499, 508 (S.C. 2010) (stating
the elements of the common-law tort of negligent misrepresentation as “(1) the defendant made
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occasions, been called fraud. Thus, I will refer to cases based in
41
Account A as cases of core fraud. Core frauds require everything
needed to establish a misrepresentation, plus something more that, in
general, is highly significant in law: the actor’s level of mental state,
fault, culpability, or moral blameworthiness.
Tort law has sometimes, but not always, distinguished
misrepresentation from core fraud. One might assert that a victim can
sue in tort for fraud without having to prove that the actor had a
42
purpose to deceive or a particular goal in mind. The word “fraud,”
43
however, has been called “a source of great mischief in tort law” and
44
“a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case.” In
American law, the tort of fraud—which also has gone by the names
deceit and misrepresentation—is an umbrella term that includes
45
several causes of action.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a tort called
“misrepresentation,” which encompasses instances of damages
incurred as a result of reliance on false information provided by
46
others.
A subcategory of misrepresentation is fraudulent
47
misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if it is made
with scienter—defined as knowledge or belief in falsity, or lack of the
a false representation to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant had a pecuniary interest in making the
statement; (3) the defendant owed a duty of care to see that he communicated truthful
information to the plaintiff; (4) the defendant breached that duty by failing to exercise due care;
(5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary
loss as the proximate result of his reliance on the representation”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159, 162 (1981) (distinguishing misrepresentation from fraud by
requiring intention for fraud but not for misrepresentation).
41. See Goldberg et al., supra note 39, at 1005 (“[T]he phenomenon of being misled stands
at the very heart of the tort action for fraud.” (emphasis added)).
42. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Adams, 388 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Neb. 1986) (“The fact that the
defendant deceives, itself, establishes scienter even though the defendant may have been
unaware of the deception. Therefore, to the extent that we have, in previous cases, included
‘intent to deceive’ as a necessary element of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation
or deceit, we specifically now reject that view . . . .”); Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d
32, 39–40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“Constructive fraud is essentially fraud without the element of
intent. Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of
constructive fraud.” (citation omitted)).
43. Goldberg et al., supra note 39, at 1003.
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 105, at 727.
45. Id. § 105, at 726; see also Leon Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749, 750–58 (1930)
(discussing how the American common law of torts has accommodated theories ranging from
“actual fraud,” which requires the intention to deceive, to “innocent misrepresentation,” which
merely causes loss).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976).
47. Id.
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background knowledge that the speaker states or implies that she has
48
in making a representation. One might believe, then, that the
Restatement sees awareness of falsity, not the intention to deceive, as
the essence of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. But the
Restatement also provides that one who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation is not liable unless she does so “for the purpose of
49
inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it.”
50
Thus, fraud cannot exist without an intention and a goal. Only the
separate tort of negligent misrepresentation can be committed
51
without such intention.
2. Goal Versus Awareness. As I have demonstrated, a basic
structural difference exists between the idea of core fraud, as
articulated in Account A, and the idea of misrepresentation, as
articulated in Account B. Core fraud is necessarily a goal-oriented
behavior. Misrepresentation need not be.
Goals and motives are not to be confused. Goals are objectives;
motives are reasons. Core fraud involves the goal of deception: the
actor forms an objective of inducing action in another through
deception and acts upon it. Her reasons for doing so may be simple or
complex, financial or emotional, self- or other-regarding. Motive is of
52
no consequence.
Misrepresentation is not, in the first instance, a question of
mental state at all. It simply requires that an actor make an utterance
48. Id. § 526.
49. Id. § 525.
50. Prosser lists the elements of “the tort cause of action in deceit” as (1) a false
representation; (2) knowledge or belief in the falsity of the representation (or lack of sufficient
information to make the representation) (known as “scienter”); (3) intention to induce the
plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in reliance on the representation; (4) justifiable reliance;
and (5) damage. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 105, at 728. If one understands, as I think one
should, that the intention to induce someone to act on a false representation is the same thing as
the intention to deceive, then Prosser is defining the tort of deceit as core fraud. But see Green,
supra note 45, at 762 (asserting that the purpose to cause a victim to act on the basis of a
misrepresentation “is entirely distinct from the purpose to defraud, deceive, or injure”).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
52. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 107, at 741. Professor Donald Langevoort states that a
speaker’s awareness of falsity is all that is required for securities fraud because the speaker’s
motive is not—and should not be—relevant to the question of scienter. Donald C. Langevoort,
Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart That Never
Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006). Langevoort seems to overlook how the
question of purpose or goal falls in the space between an actor’s mere awareness and her motive
or reason for acting. The purpose of deception can serve many potential motives. The
distinction is between matters within the actor’s near sight and those out on her horizon.
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or engage in an act that induces misapprehension in another. To find
the actor at fault, however, the law considers his mental processes,
even if no actual mental state is ultimately required. The crucial point
is what this fault inquiry will apply to: not the actor’s goal, but rather
54
whether the representation or conduct was false or misleading.
This is a question of awareness, or lack thereof. Available mental
states or fault measures include: practical certainty (knowledge);
awareness of a high probability of falsity, coupled with the avoidance
of information (willful blindness); conscious disregard of a substantial
probability (recklessness); lack of awareness demonstrating
substantial deviance (gross negligence or, in some formulations,
recklessness); lack of awareness due to a failure to take due care
(negligence); and simple lack of awareness, even in spite of due care
(strict liability).
For a conception of fraud that is based in misrepresentation, an
inquiry into the actor’s awareness of the falsity of her representation,
or of the tendency of her conduct to mislead, is both necessary and
sufficient. For a conception based in core fraud, an inquiry into the
actor’s goal in making the false representation or engaging in the
misleading conduct is necessary.
A remaining question is whether, in the instance of core fraud,
an inquiry into the actor’s fault with regard to the falsity of a
representation or the tendency of certain conduct to mislead is also
necessary.
It can be, for two reasons. First, a purpose to deceive, coupled
with misleading statements or conduct, ordinarily entails an actor’s
having adverted, to some degree, to the falsity of her representation
or to the tendency of her conduct to mislead. But the way in which
she adverted can vary. She could have been sure of her
representation’s falsity, she could have been pretty sure and decided
not to check, she could have known there was a risk of falsity and
53. See, e.g., Game On Ventures, Inc. v. Gen. RV Ctr., Inc., 587 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (“[C]ontrary to fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud, a plaintiff asserting
an innocent misrepresentation claim need not prove that the defendant intended to deceive the
plaintiff into relying on the false or misleading representation.” (citation omitted)); W. Side
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of N.Y.C. v. Hirschfeld, 476 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (App. Div. 1984) (“If we
subtract from fraud the element of scienter the remainder constitutes the tort of innocent
misrepresentation.” (citation omitted)).
54. Cf. United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 478–79 (2d Cir. 2003) (clarifying the
distinction in the crime of conspiracy between the element of knowledge of the existence and
the goals of the conspiracy, for which the theory of willful blindness is relevant, and the element
of intent to advance conspiracy toward its goals, for which such a theory is not permissible).
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been indifferent to it, and so on. A conception of core fraud might,
for example, require both a goal of deception and practical certainty
that a representation is false; or it might require a goal of deception
and only lack of due care as to whether a representation is false.
Second, in cases of core fraud, any inquiry into awareness has a
nearly unavoidable evidentiary problem. Goals are not observable.
The factual matter of falsity is usually at least partially observable. An
ex post juridical determination about whether an actor’s goal was to
deceive will almost always include considering whether the actor was
aware—and how aware she was—that her representation was false or
that her conduct was misleading. By inference, the more aware she
was, the more likely it is that she meant to deceive. Indeed, fraud
cases often may be brought on nothing more than allegations of
falsity, with the moving party relying on argument and inference to
get all the way to judgment.
Two conclusions follow from the preceding discussion of goals
and awareness. First, any conception of fraud must include
consideration of the mental state or fault requirements that will apply
to the actor’s awareness. And second, if the question of awareness is
not distinguished from the question of goals, confusion of core fraud
with misrepresentation is likely to result. For example, if a court holds
that fraud requires an intent to defraud and that an intent to defraud,
55
in turn, requires scienter as to the falsity of the representation, then
the second fault standard has displaced the first.
This matter of awareness of falsity has long been challenging.
Consider Professor William Prosser’s classic treatise on torts, which
talks about the required intent for the tort of fraud as “the intent to
deceive” and defines it as “the intent that a representation shall be
made, that it shall be directed to a particular person or class of
persons, that it shall convey a certain meaning, that it shall be
56
believed, and that it shall be acted upon in a certain way.” But the
treatise goes on to say, “[O]bviously this intent [to deceive], which
has been given the name of ‘scienter’ by the courts, must be a matter
57
of belief, or of absence of belief, that the misrepresentation is true.”
A bit further along, it explains that a speaker who asserts knowledge

55. See, e.g., In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that,
in an action for securities fraud, knowledge, or even recklessness, can establish the required
“exacting threshold of scienter” with respect to the intent to deceive).
56. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 107, at 741.
57. Id.
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of a fact of which he does not in truth have knowledge will be “found
to have the intent to deceive, not so much as to the fact itself, but
58
rather as to the extent of his information.”
Consider also the discussion among British jurists in Derry v.
59
Peek, the seminal case on the tort of deceit, in which the evidentiary
point was stated more clearly. Lord Herschell announced, “[F]raud is
proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly,
60
careless whether it be true or false.” This statement has often been
invoked in support of a concept of reckless fraud, a matter to which I
61
turn shortly.
But Lord Herschell quickly added, “[T]he third is but an instance
of the second, for one who makes a statement under such
62
circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states.”
He noted, “I think there is here some confusion between that which is
63
evidence of fraud, and that which constitutes it.” Lord Bramwell
similarly pointed out in Derry: “[I]n all the judgments [of my
colleagues] there is, I must say it, a confusion of unreasonableness of
belief as evidence of dishonesty, and unreasonableness of belief as of
64
itself a ground of action.”

58. Id. § 107, at 742. Holmes begins his discussion of fraud by saying that the actor must
intend to deceive—in his formulation, intend “that the other should believe and act upon” a
misrepresentation. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 90 (Am. Bar Ass’n
Publ’g 2009) (1881). But then, in a nearly impenetrable passage, Holmes dispenses with mental
state, concluding that the whole matter really reduces to “an external standard of conduct”
under which a statement that, objectively evaluated, would tend to mislead is, in fact, a
statement made with the intent to deceive. Id. at 91–93. Holmes concedes that the tort of fraud
is thus “more extensive than the sphere of actual moral fraud” because, “starting from the moral
ground, it works out an external standard of what would be fraudulent in the average prudent
member of the community, and requires every member at his peril to avoid that.” Id. at 93.
Holmes appears to have been working with a conception of fraud similar to the one described in
Account B in Part I.C.1.
59. Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
60. Id. at 374 (Lord Herschell L.J.).
61. See, e.g., Sandberg v. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 346 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1992)
(referencing Derry for the proposition that “conscious disregard of whether a statement is true
satisf[ies] the scienter requirement”), vacated, No. 91-1873(L), 1993 WL 524680 (4th Cir. Apr. 7,
1993); United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA) Ltd., 848 F. Supp. 751, 761 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (citing Derry for the proposition that a reckless misrepresentation is sufficient to
prove fraud); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Giacomi, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 66, 78 (Super. Ct. 1993) (“[A]
statement recklessly made is one not honestly made.”).
62. Derry, 14 App. Cas. at 374 (Lord Herschell L.J.).
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id. at 352 (Lord Bramwell L.J.).
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3. Level of Awareness. Once the matters of purpose and
awareness have been distinguished, one must consider the level of
mental state or fault that is required to establish sufficient awareness
of falsity or tendency to mislead. A fulsome conception of fraud must
include some choices on this matter. Various bodies of fraud law have
often called this the question of “scienter.”
Scienter is a confusing word because its most natural meaning—
65
and the one often associated with it—is knowledge. But the term is
used, at least in the area of securities fraud, to mean simply level of
66
fault. A statement like “scienter is required for liability” often is
meant to do no more than rule out strict liability. In this form,
scienter stands for a full menu of choices on the matter of awareness:
knowledge, knowledge plus willful blindness, recklessness, gross
negligence, or negligence.
Which level to choose is a function of the conception of fraud
one wishes to pursue. A regime centered on the belief that fraud is a
problem of costs and harm might—in its focus on results caused, not
plans hatched—require a low level of fault or perhaps no scienter at
all. The choice of a scienter definition might depend on such things as
one’s calculation of the relative costs of harm and its avoidance;
whether the regime is compensatory, punitive, or injunctive; whether
it regulates all actors or only particular industries; whether it affords
class action relief or does not; and whether it is a matter of state or
federal law.
A regime centered on culpability and blameworthiness—in its
focus on responsibility for acts of deception—is likely to require not
only some scienter but a high level of awareness. The choice of a
scienter definition might depend on one’s general views about the
blameworthiness of negligent or reckless conduct, one’s specific views
about the blameworthiness of negligent or reckless acts in the context
of fraud, and one’s assessment of how risks of error with respect to
65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) first defines scienter as “[a] degree of
knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or
omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or
criminal punishment.” Id. 1463; see also 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3411 (3d rev. ed. 2003) (defining scienter in the common-law action for deceit as
knowledge of the falsity of one’s representation).
66. An alternative definition of scienter is “[a] mental state consisting in an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at 1463; see also
7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 3414 (stating that scienter has been used to mean
“everything from knowing falsity . . . to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence
or even liability without fault”).
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the question of intent to deceive might vary according to the rule that
applies to the actor’s awareness of the falsity of her representation or
the tendency of her conduct to mislead.
Whatever level of fault is chosen, it must be clearly specified.
Specifying the level of fault is especially important with regard to
recklessness because the law of fraud has often been unclear as to
67
whether reckless fraud exists or should exist.
The most precise and demanding definition of recklessness, and
the one most often used in criminal law, is the one found in the Model
Penal Code: the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk—provided that the actor’s disregard of that risk grossly deviates
68
from how a reasonable person would act in the same circumstances.
Under this definition, recklessness is a form of knowledge. The actor
is actually aware of the risk that inheres in the situation, as opposed
to, in the case of a full knowledge requirement, having the practical
certainty that it inheres. I call this the “conscious-disregard” form of
69
recklessness.
As is well known, other formulations of recklessness treat it as a
70
heightened form of negligence. In these formulations, recklessness
does not generally require the actual, subjective disregard of a risk.
As with negligence, the actor must have failed to advert to and act
upon a risk—the difference from negligence being that the actor’s

67. See infra text accompanying notes 147–71.
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
69. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The
Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2001) (“[F]or recklessness to be
present, the actor must not only know that the risk is great and easily avoidable, but she also
must subjectively entertain callous indifference to the plight of would-be victims.”).
70. See United States v. Shortman, 91 F.3d 80, 81 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Gross negligence is
defined as wanton or reckless disregard for human life.” (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Liberty Grp., 965 F.2d 879, 884 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he line between gross
negligence and recklessness is a fine one at best. ‘[T]here is often no clear distinction at all
between [recklessness] and ‘gross’ negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on
the same meaning.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra
note 25, § 34, at 214)); St. Onge v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co., 321 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (“The term ‘gross negligence’—when it is used to describe an extreme departure
from the ordinary standard of care—has essentially the same meaning as the term
‘recklessness.’”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1964) (defining “reckless disregard
of safety” as “knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but
also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent”).
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failure represents more than a lack of due care. The failure
demonstrates a high level of social deviance. That deviance relates to
the degree of the risk, the nature of the risk, or a combination of the
72
two. I call this the “super-negligence” form of recklessness.
The argument in favor of choosing the conscious-disregard form
of recklessness would proceed as follows. It is blameworthy—or
should require compensation, or should be deterred, et cetera—to
cause another to act to her detriment in reliance on a representation
that one knows is false, or perhaps even to attempt to do so. When an
actor makes a representation on which another relies to her
detriment, and the actor knows that the representation may be false,
the actor is doing something that justifies sanction just as much as if
73
she knows it is false. She represents herself as speaking
authoritatively on a matter of importance when she knows that what
74
she is uttering might be poppycock. One could say that she does in
fact have full knowledge: she knows that she is falsely representing to
the listener, by implication, her own level of knowledge about what
71. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 58, at 92–93 (finding recklessness in the fraud context
when “the data for the statement were so far insufficient that a prudent man could not have
made it without leading to the inference that he was indifferent” and noting that “if a man
makes his statement on those data, he is liable, whatever was the state of his mind, and although
he individually may have been perfectly free from wickedness in making it”).
72. Though I do not think it necessary here, one could drill deeper into the concept of
recklessness. Professor Kim Ferzan argues for consideration of a third form of recklessness that
she calls “opaque recklessness.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 597, 598–99 (2001). According to Professor Ferzan, an actor is exercising
opaque recklessness when she considers the riskiness of her behavior in some general sense (for
example, it is dangerous to drive too fast) but does not consider the specific risk for which she
may be liable (for example, if I drive too fast, I may strike and kill that pedestrian possibly
crossing a block down the road). Id. Professor Ken Simons argues that there are three aspects or
types of recklessness: (1) “cognitive” recklessness, involving awareness of risk (a “belief state”);
(2) reckless indifference, involving “callousness” toward risk (a “desire state”); and (3)
recklessness in the gross negligence sense (a conduct standard, not a mental state). Kenneth W.
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 465 (1992).
73. A more ambitious version of this argument has been mounted by Professor Larry
Alexander, who argues that recklessness should be viewed as equivalent to intent and
knowledge for the general purposes of the criminal law because, properly defined, recklessness
involves the same “basic moral vice of insufficient concern for the interests of others.” Larry
Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 931, 931 (2000).
74. See Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, 368 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)
(Lord Herschell L.J.) (“Any person making [a statement that he intends another to act upon]
must always be aware that the person to whom it is made will understand, if not that he who
makes it knows, yet at least that he believes it to be true. And if he has no such belief he is as
much guilty of fraud as if he had made any other representation which he knew to be false, or
did not believe to be true.”).
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75

she asserts. This form of recklessness is “substantial and
unjustifiable” in cases in which the actor’s decision to go forward with
her statement is genuinely deviant because the known risk that the
statement is poppycock is high.
The argument in favor of liability based on the super-negligence
version of recklessness is very different. That argument would assert
that it is blameworthy not to be careful about the accuracy of one’s
statements when others might rely on such statements to their
detriment, that law ought to give people incentives to be more careful
about what they say when others are likely to rely on their
statements, and that people who rely on the careless statements of
others to their detriment are entitled to compensation. This principle,
the argument would maintain, applies with force only in cases in
which the carelessness is serious.
One could play out similar arguments about choosing fault
formulations based on knowledge, negligence, or strict liability, but
the basic point has been made: a clear conception of fraud requires
taking a position on the matter of the actor’s awareness, and that
position should include a precise articulation of the applicable
doctrinal measure of awareness.
4. Criminal Fault. If one’s conception of fraud is to include the
availability of criminal sanctions, further questions about mental state
arise. First, is one prepared to impose criminal sanctions for what the
law has called mere misrepresentation? One might permit such a
regime if it carried relatively light penalties, perhaps limited to fines.
But criminal fraud regimes in the United States typically make
76
lengthy prison terms available. I am not aware of any serious
scholarly argument in favor of basing criminal liability for fraud on,
for example, simple negligence. And a wide range of criminal regimes
in the United States at least purport to require proof of “intent to
77
defraud.”

75. See id. (stating that someone who is reckless as to whether her representation is false
should be just as liable as someone who does not believe that her representation is true).
76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (providing a thirty-year maximum prison term for
bank fraud); id. § 1348 (prescribing a twenty-five-year maximum prison term for securities or
commodities fraud).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011) (health-care fraud);
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 312 (6th Cir. 2010) (bank fraud); Cox v. State, 964 P.2d
1235, 1236 (Wyo. 1998) (check fraud).
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Second, how does one distinguish civil and criminal fraud?
Criminal liability is usually justified on the grounds that certain
behavior is particularly blameworthy or is only deterrable with
especially strong sanctions. The nature of an actor’s mental processes
and the extent of the harm she inflicts or risks inflicting are the two
primary means for measuring these criteria. Both retributivist and
consequentialist lines of argument might place significant weight on
mental processes and harm.
In the case of fraud, then, criminal liability might be
distinguished from civil liability either because of the actor’s
blameworthy mental state or because she imposed, or risked
imposing, a particularly serious or large loss. Although the degree of
harm is a major influence on prosecutorial discretion and on the
decisionmaking of judges and juries, it is difficult to embody in the
law of fraud. How much and what kind of harm, stated in general
terms, is sufficient to make a fraud case “really criminal”? Intuitions
may be strong at the level of individual cases, but articulating a
78
standard is difficult.
The dimension of mental state is a more promising route to
general principles distinguishing civil fraud from criminal fraud. After
all, the very existence of criminal liability for fraud requires
justification, and mental state turns out to be important for
understanding why criminal punishment is justified in some cases of
79
fraud. But my agenda here is not to make the case for criminal
liability for fraud. I am instead taking it as a given feature of positive
law and am asking what constitutes its essential elements. Those
necessary elements include an aggravating factor that distinguishes it
from civil liability for fraud. And that aggravating factor is most easily
located in mental state.
If criminal liability for fraud requires a higher level of culpability,
what is it? It could be intent to defraud—simply the purpose to
deceive. But that choice would entail two commitments: First, it
would mean that civil liability for fraud does not require a purpose to
deceive—otherwise, one has not distinguished the two forms of

78. The U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2010) uses a relatively crude dollar-lossto-the-victim metric, id. § 2B1.1, which has been subject to abundant criticism, see, e.g., Samuel
W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611,
1612 (2007).
79. See Buell, supra note 22, at 2022–36 (explaining how an actor’s awareness of the
wrongfulness of his deceptive conduct can justify his punishment for fraud).
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liability. Second, it would mean that having the goal of deception is
sufficient to warrant criminal punishment.
Neither commitment is easy to make. I have already explored
why one’s conception of fraud might require a purpose to deceive in
all instances, including for civil liability. And one might be
uncomfortable with the idea that a deceptive purpose alone marks
one for criminal sanctions. Markets are full of deceptive conduct,
some of which is common enough to be relatively innocuous and a lot
of which goes by other names—like sales, advertising, and savvy
negotiation. The blameworthiness of deception, like the
blameworthiness of lying, can vary a great deal with context.
What if one therefore would prefer a higher level of fault for
criminal fraud liability? I have previously developed the argument
that this higher level of culpability—as a matter of both positive law
and normative justification—should be awareness of the wrongfulness
80
of one’s own conduct. In other words, the actor must not only intend
to deceive the listener but also intend to deceive the listener in a
manner the actor knows is wrongful in the particular context in which
she acts.
In easy cases of fraud, this mental state is implicit in the actor’s
conduct. Everyone knows operating a billion-dollar Ponzi scheme is
not only fraudulent, but wrongful. There is no question that Bernie
81
Madoff knew what he was doing was wrong. In harder cases of
fraud, however—particularly ones that involve novel forms of
deception—awareness of wrongfulness can usually be established
only by evidence that the actor engaged in efforts to cover her tracks
or to prevent others from seeing the true nature of what she was
doing. Such acts are sometimes labeled with the ancient term “badges
82
of fraud.”
A complete understanding of fraud would require book-length
treatment. I have sketched enough of the general project of

80. Id. In the criminal securities context, Professor Michael Seigel argues for a similar
requirement of knowledge of wrongfulness, although Seigel describes the requirement—
confusingly, in my view—as affording the defendant a “weak mistake-of-law defense.” Seigel,
supra note 28, at 1609–10.
81. That is, unless he was delusional. Perhaps many flagrant fraudsters are. But, as in other
areas of criminal law, delusion that does not rise to the level of legal insanity cannot negate
liability.
82. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 22, at 1983 (“‘[B]adges of guilt’ . . . ha[ve] been an important
feature of the law’s response to commercial behavior since the seventeenth century.”).
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understanding fraud to turn now to the more specific question at
hand: How should one understand the concept of securities fraud?
II. WHAT IS SECURITIES FRAUD?
Rule 10b-5, the principal font of the law of securities fraud, is
83
about to turn seventy. It can make a plausible claim to being the
84
most consequential piece of American administrative law. But the
rule has an awkward textual structure and virtually no administrative
85
history. Its status as a legal Swiss army knife—used to punish, to
83. The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 3407–08.
84. The rule has sparked thousands of lawsuits, causing billions of dollars to change hands.
See Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/
settle.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011) (providing summaries of settlement amounts for securities
class action lawsuits). It has produced hundreds of judicial opinions, including opinions by some
of the most esteemed jurists of the past century. A Westlaw search limited to federal courts of
appeals decisions in which the term “securities fraud” appears in the synopsis of the case
produced 1589 opinions as of November 9, 2011. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551 (1979) (Powell, J.); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (Powell, J.);
Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.); United States v. Simon,
425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.). The rule has also routinely spawned headlines in the
nation’s leading papers. A Westlaw search of The New York Times database since 1980 for
items that include “fraud” in the headline and “securities fraud” in the body of the text
produced 424 articles as of November 9, 2011. A Westlaw search in The Wall Street Journal
abstracts database since 1990 produced 643 article abstracts in which the term “securities fraud”
appears, as of November 9, 2011. The rule has sent hundreds of people to prison, some for
decades. See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 542 (5th Cir. 2009) (reporting that the
district court had sentenced the defendant, a former CEO of Enron, to over twenty-four years
of imprisonment for one count of conspiracy, twelve counts of fraud, five counts of making false
statements, and one count of insider trading), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 130 S.
Ct. 2896 (2010); United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the
district court’s twelve- and seventeen-year sentences for bank fraud against John and Timothy
Rigas, the former CEO and CFO of Adelphia Communications, Corp., respectively); United
States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 112, 130 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming a twenty-five-year sentence for
conspiracy and securities fraud against the former CEO of WorldCom). The Federal Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) shows that over 1100 people were criminally prosecuted for securities
fraud between 1994 and 2008. This data was obtained by visiting http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/
tsec.cfm and following the prompts to produce a report for the number of total defendants that
were prosecuted from 1994 to 2008 under 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934). And, of course, the rule has been fodder for an enormous literature. As of
November 9, 2011, eighty-four papers that use the term “securities fraud” in their titles have
been posted on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). A Westlaw search in the Journals
and Law Reviews (JLR) database for articles using the term “securities fraud” in their titles
produced 281 works as of November 9, 2011. A similar search in the HeinOnline Law Journal
Library database produced 302 articles as of November 9, 2011.
85. See 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAWS §§ 6:1–:3, at 6-3 to -11 (2011) (describing the scant legislative and administrative history
of the statute and the rule); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET 99 (3d ed. 2003) (“[T]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was a marvel of irresolution.
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enjoin, to shame, to regulate, to fine, to debar, to sue, to compensate,
and more—makes it perhaps understandable that its core meaning
has become fractured, confused, and even at odds with itself.
The law of securities regulation does not stand on a single
conception of fraud. “Securities fraud” is an umbrella term for several
causes of action, some of which are for forms of core fraud and some
of which are for forms of misrepresentation. Given the voluminous
materials available on securities fraud, a tour through this body of law
might seem unnecessary. But I believe that lawyers and policymakers
have failed to notice how strange and untethered the concept of
securities fraud has become.
In this Part, to focus attention on the nature and extent of the
problem, I guide the reader somewhat briskly through the current
landscape of securities fraud law—first, by explaining the structure of
the statutes and rules; second, by summarizing how the courts have
described the essential requirements of those statutes and rules; third,
by showing the substantial confusion in the current doctrine relating
to mental state and fault; and finally, by situating the law of insider
trading within my general description of the law of securities fraud.
A. Structure of the Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
When lawyers talk about securities fraud, they usually mean
conduct that violates Rule 10b-5 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. For three reasons, the term “securities fraud” must also
be understood to refer to Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 (’33
86
Act). First, Section 17 can be deployed by the SEC in civil regulatory
actions and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in criminal
87
prosecutions, though not by plaintiffs in private lawsuits. Second,
Rule 10b-5’s antifraud language was drawn directly from the text of
88
Section 17, with only slight variations. And third, the courts have

On most controversial substantive issues, Congress had been stalemated. Rather than providing
the new Commission with a clear mandate, the legislators had granted the agency authority to
study the controversy or issue its own rules.”).
86. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006); id. § 17.
87. Id. §§ 20, 24; Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998).
88. 5B JACOBS, supra note 85, § 6:3, at 6-11; 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 3408.
The language of the two prohibitions varies some. The full texts follow, with points of significant
difference in italics. Section 17 of the ’33 Act makes it a violation “in the offer or sale of any
securities . . . directly or indirectly”:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
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sometimes interpreted Rule 10b-5 and Section 17 in relation to one
another, although important distinctions have been drawn between
89
them.
Textually, the securities fraud regime works like this: Section 17
of the ’33 Act prohibits: (1) schemes or artifices to defraud, (2) false
statements of fact or omissions that make truthful affirmative
statements misleading, and (3) acts or practices that operate as frauds

(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17 (emphasis added). Rule 10b-5 makes it a violation “directly or
indirectly” and “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (emphasis added). Section 17 is thus broader, potentially applying
to those who use the false representations of others. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442–48
(1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (exploring this distinction in depth and rejecting the theory that
persons who merely have some role in the dissemination of the misrepresentations of others
could be held liable under the second prong of Rule 10b-5).
Alas, the origins of Section 17’s language—and thus Rule 10b-5’s—shed little light on
how to construe the text. Congress appears to have borrowed the statutory language primarily
from New York’s antifraud provision for the securities markets, the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 352-c (McKinney 1996), which, in turn, had borrowed from Maryland’s antifraud statute,
Act of Apr. 16, 1920, ch. 552, 1920 Md. Laws 1135, the textual origins of which are obscure. See
Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong. passim (1933) (discussing various state-level antifraud statutes, including
those in Maryland and New York); Securities Act: Hearing on S. 875 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 73d Cong. passim (1933) (discussing the Martin Act during a debate about
the federal securities act); Decatur H. Miller, A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act, 23
MD. L. REV. 289, 293–94 (1963) (discussing the origins of Maryland’s antifraud statute); Letter
from George W. Hodges to Tracy Stagg (Apr. 25, 1921), reprinted in N.Y. STATE LIBRARY,
BILL JACKET COLLECTION, ch. 649, at 6 (discussing the need to pass an antifraud law in New
York that is similar to the Maryland antifraud law); Letter from Arthur W. Loasby to Nathan L.
Miller, Governor of N.Y. (Apr. 12, 1921), reprinted in N.Y. STATE LIBRARY, supra, ch. 649, at 3
(noting that the New York antifraud statute “follows quite closely the Maryland statute”).
89. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687–700 (1980) (examining the SEC’s duty to
establish scienter when seeking injunctions for violations of Section 17 or Rule 10b-5 and
holding that scienter is required to establish violations of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a)(1) but
not Sections 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3)).
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90

or deceits. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34
91
Act)
prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” contravening any rule the SEC might make against such
92
things. And, like Section 17, Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s principal exercise
of authority under Section 10, prohibits: (1) schemes or artifices to
defraud, (2) false statements of fact or omissions that make truthful
affirmative statements misleading, and (3) acts or practices that
93
operate as frauds or deceits.
As a matter of statutes and rules, the law of securities fraud is
extremely broad. It can be read to cover both core fraud—in its talk
of “schemes,” “fraud,” and “deceit”—and cases of misrepresentation
that involve only a harm-focused inquiry—in its talk of false
94
statements and acts that “operate as” deceits. One can divide causes
of action for securities fraud along three dimensions: (1) the nature of
the moving party, (2) the type of conduct alleged to violate the law,
and (3) the relief sought.
Private plaintiffs may only bring lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 and
95
may only seek damages. Such lawsuits may be based on an allegation
of a scheme to defraud, a false statement or omission, or an act or
96
practice that “operates as” a fraud. Thus, three private causes of
action for securities fraud exist, all for monetary sanctions.
The SEC may bring administrative actions or lawsuits under both
97
Rule 10b-5 and Section 17. The SEC may seek disgorgement of

90. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 (1979) (explaining that Section 17 prohibits
three distinct categories of misconduct).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
92. Id. § 10.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
94. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 678–90
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing the differences between Rule 10b-5 cases based on
misrepresentations and cases based on failures of disclosure); Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos.,
383 F. Supp. 2d 223, 238–39 (D. Mass. 2004) (discussing the three different categories of conduct
that can implicate Rule 10b-5).
95. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v.
Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see also Maldonado v. Dominguez,
137 F.2d 1, 6, 9–10 (1st Cir. 1998) (permitting the plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 claims to proceed but
dismissing the plaintiff’s Section 17 claims because there is no implied private cause of action
under Section 17).
96. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont’l/Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 140 F.R.D. 425, 428–29 (D.
Ariz. 1992) (explaining that plaintiffs must prove either a scheme to defraud, a false statement
or omission, or a fraudulent act or practice to succeed in their Rule 10b-5 claims).
97. Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2006); id. § 20; Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 21A–21D.
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profits, fines, or injunctive relief—most often including bars on
98
further violations and/or on service as a corporate officer or director.
All such actions may be based on an allegation of a scheme to
defraud, a false statement or omission, or an act or practice that
99
“operates as” a fraud. Setting aside the agency’s choice between an
100
administrative forum and a district court, six types of SEC action for
securities fraud are possible, one for each combination of a type of
wrongdoing with a type of relief.
The DOJ may bring criminal actions for securities fraud under
both Rule 10b-5 and Section 17, provided that the cases involve
101
“willful” conduct. The DOJ may seek typical criminal sentences
102
consisting of restitution, fines, and/or imprisonment. Prosecutions
may be based on an allegation of a scheme to defraud, a false
statement or omission, or an act or practice that “operates as” a
fraud. Thus, the DOJ may bring three types of criminal action for
securities fraud.
For those keeping score, that makes a dozen causes of action for
securities fraud. The pie could be divided other ways. And, in most
cases, the moving party is likely to allege multiple types of violating
conduct and to seek various forms of relief. In addition, private
lawsuits, SEC actions, and DOJ prosecutions are often initiated in

98. Securities Act of 1933 § 8.
99. See supra note 96.
100. See supra note 97.
101. Securities Act of 1933 § 24; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32. Since 2002, the
Department of Justice has also been able to prosecute for securities fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1348 (2006), which covers any person who
knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any
person in connection with . . . any security of an issuer [required to register or report
under the ’34 Act]; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase
or sale of . . . any security of an issuer [required to register or report under the ’34
Act].
Id. The case law on this statute is not well developed. See United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *10–19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006) (explaining that the statute had been
patterned on mail and wire fraud statutes and thus should be interpreted similarly and exploring
the relevance of Title 15 securities law to the “in connection with” requirement of the statute).
Notice that this statute does not include a parallel provision to the second (misrepresentation or
omission) prongs of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17. It could, and probably should, be argued that
this statute covers only core fraud and requires proof of a purpose to deceive.
102. Securities Act of 1933 § 24; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32; 18 U.S.C. § 3551
(2006). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2006) (detailing sentencing procedures and
available penalties).
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overlapping fashion for a single matter of wrongdoing. The point of
organizing things as I have is to make identifying the various forms of
action that can be involved in the supposedly singular category of
securities fraud easier.
B. Elements, According to the Federal Courts
These statutory and rule provisions cannot be read in isolation.
The law of securities fraud is one of the most heavily judicially
created bodies of federal law. Even such a self-respecting textualist as
the late Chief Justice Rehnquist famously called the law of Rule 10b5 “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
104
acorn.” Thus, one needs to apply the judicial gloss, to the extent
that it is discernible, to each of the actions I have identified.
For the private causes of action, the Supreme Court has said that
a plaintiff must prove six elements: (1) “a material misrepresentation
(or omission)”; (2) “scienter, i. e., a wrongful state of mind”; (3) “a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security”; (4) “reliance”; (5)
“economic loss”; and (6) “‘loss causation,’ i. e., a causal connection
105
between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” But this is
not quite right. A material misrepresentation or omission is not the
only kind of conduct that can violate Rule 10b-5, as the Supreme
106
Court itself has recognized. Element (1) must be understood to
include schemes to defraud and acts or practices that “operate as”

103. The Enron affair, for example, resulted in criminal prosecutions, e.g., United States v.
Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011); a class action lawsuit, Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d
463, 467 (5th Cir. 2008); and various SEC enforcement actions, see Spotlight on Enron, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enron.htm (last modified May 11, 2010).
104. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
105. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
106. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–30 (1980) (explaining how silence in
the face of a duty to disclose can constitute fraud); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972) (explaining how nondisclosure can constitute fraud); see also
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1977) (holding that a breach of fiduciary
duty alone does not constitute securities fraud in the absence of some form of deception); SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181–82 (1963) (holding that a registered
investment advisor commits fraud when he purchases “shares of security for his own account
shortly before recommending that security for long-term investment and then immediately
sell[s] the shares at a profit”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA),
Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 383–85 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing in depth the necessity of a showing of a
duty to support a Rule 10b-5 claim based on a theory of fraud by nondisclosure). But see United
States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a duty to disclose under Rule
10b-5 does not arise from a corporate executive’s general fiduciary relationship with
shareholders).
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fraud—that is, to mean something more like “conduct that falls within
the scope of Rule 10b-5(a)(1), (2), or (3).”
The elements of SEC regulatory actions vary from this scheme in
the following ways: The fourth, fifth, and sixth elements mostly fall
away. When it charges securities fraud, the SEC is not a victim
seeking damages, so it need not show that it did anything, much less
that it acted in reliance on anything the defendant did. Nor does the
107
SEC need to show that it suffered any loss. The law could require
the SEC to prove those things on behalf of someone else—a harmed
investor who is not a party to the action, for example—but the law
does not, for perhaps obvious reasons. The SEC needs to prove
something like damages only to the extent that it seeks, among other
108
remedies, disgorgement of the defendant’s profits.
The SEC’s burden differs from that of the private plaintiff in at
least three respects. The SEC can proceed under both Section 17 and
109
Rule 10b-5; according to a Supreme Court holding, Section 17
requires less than Rule 10b-5 to establish “scienter.” In addition, the
SEC can bring actions for injunctive relief that, in terms of the
common-law roots of securities fraud, are more like actions in equity
110
than, as with private lawsuits for damages, actions in law. Finally,
the SEC may bring actions against persons who “aid and abet” others
111
in committing securities fraud, but private plaintiffs may not.
In other respects, the SEC’s cases for securities fraud are like
private plaintiffs’. The SEC must have a theory based on one of
Section 17’s or Rule 10b-5’s forms of violating conduct—including
that the form of conduct satisfies the materiality requirement of the
112
law of securities fraud. The SEC must establish some form of
113
scienter. And the defendant must have acted in connection with the
114
purchase or sale of a security.
107. See, e.g., SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that the SEC need not prove reliance to establish a Rule 10b-5 cause of action).
108. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)(1)(2) (2006).
109. See supra note 89.
110. See, e.g., id. at 701–02 (allowing the SEC to bring an action for injunctive relief).
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20; Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
112. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445–47 (1976).
113. See, e.g., SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
the SEC must establish scienter to sue under Rule 10b-5).
114. See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that the SEC’s
authority under Section 10(b) is limited to actions that are in connection with the purchase or
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Finally, the government may bring a criminal prosecution for
securities fraud. The DOJ is situated much like the SEC. It need not
prove anything like reliance, damages, or loss causation unless, at
sentencing, it wants to establish that the defendant ought to be
ordered to pay restitution to the victims. Indeed, securities fraud
includes attempt liability. As under the law of mail and wire fraud,
the DOJ need only establish that someone pursued a “scheme” to
115
defraud, even if that scheme never got off the ground. But the DOJ
still must prove a form of violating conduct, including satisfying the
116
materiality requirement, and it must establish scienter. A criminal
prosecution, of course, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not
by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
Before turning to the matter of mental states, I should note that
the law of securities fraud is not clear—across all forms of its civil and
criminal remedies—on the extent to which nondisclosure and conduct
117
alone can support a claim of fraud. The courts have clearly
recognized that some forms of nondisclosure in some fiduciary and
118
similar relationships can constitute securities fraud. But the statutes,
rules, and decisions have provided no general rule or justification for
precisely which circumstances are likely to trigger duties of
119
heightened candor.
sale of securities); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Geman v. SEC,
334 F.3d 1183, 1190–92 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Rana Research, 8 F.3d at 1363–64 (same).
115. E.g., United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that success is
not a required element for fraud).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (outlining the
elements of securities fraud).
117. This is the intersection of the fraud axes of act (a), context (c), and type of harm (e)
discussed in Part I. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.
118. As I will discuss, insider trading law is largely based on a requirement to “disclose or
abstain” from trading. Compare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1977)
(holding that a breach of fiduciary duty alone does not constitute fraud under the ’34 Act in the
absence of some form of deception), with SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 192–95 (1963) (holding that, in an action by the SEC for injunctive relief, a fiduciary’s
nondisclosure of disloyal conduct can constitute fraud under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2006), in part because, in actions at equity, the common law of
fraud did not always require proof of harm or intent to defraud).
119. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty To Disclose Under
Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1646–74 (2004) (highlighting “major areas in which there is
inconsistency on the basic duty question”); see also Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose and Cause
in the Law of Deception 2–3 (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1756831 (“[T]here is a
deep error in the common law tendency to conflate fraud by misrepresentation, fraud by
concealment, and fraud by nondisclosure, which in fact involve different regulatory
approaches . . . .”).
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C. The Scienter Mess
Now comes the hard part—and the nub of the matter. As I
established in Part I, distinctions among conceptions of fraud are
embodied in doctrine largely through the treatment of mental state
and fault. A core, culpability-based conception of fraud, based on
Account A, requires both the purpose to deceive and some level of
fault with regard to the falsity of the actor’s representation or the
tendency of the actor’s conduct or omission to mislead.
Misrepresentation, based on Account B, does not require the purpose
to deceive and can be established, depending on the normative stance
the law chooses, by various levels of fault with regard to the falsity of
the actor’s misrepresentation or the tendency of the actor’s conduct
or omission to mislead. The Supreme Court’s statement that
securities fraud requires “scienter, i. e., a wrongful state of mind” thus
merely begins the inquiry that is critical to determining which
120
conception of fraud the law embodies.
In this Section, I explain—as best I can, given the poor state of
the doctrine—what “scienter” means in each type of action for
securities fraud.
1. Private Lawsuits. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that, in a
private lawsuit for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must
121
prove “‘scienter’—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” The
Court’s primary justification for this holding was that Section 10 of
the ’34 Act authorizes the SEC to make rules only against
122
“manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s].” These
words imply seriously culpable conduct—planning, scheming, and the
like. Given this language, it would not be a valid exercise of the SEC’s
powers to apply Rule 10b-5 to less faulty conduct.
One might think, on the basis of this holding, that Rule 10b-5
rests on a conception of core fraud. But that is not the case. The
Supreme Court quickly added in a footnote: “In certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
123
purposes of imposing liability for some act.” And the Court
expressly stated that it was not deciding the question whether
120. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
121. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
122. Id. at 197–201 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. 78j (2006))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
123. Id. at 193 n.12.
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recklessness could suffice for Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement.
The Court has not revisited this question for over thirty years; in the
meantime, the federal appellate courts have uniformly held that
125
recklessness can establish scienter under Rule 10b-5.
Based on this state of the law, one must conclude that a private
lawsuit for securities fraud can be brought for misrepresentation, in
addition to core fraud. While speaking out of one side of its mouth to
suggest that Rule 10b-5 requires intent to defraud, the Court spoke
out of the other side to suggest that recklessness might suffice.
Moreover, it ignored the distinction between the two levels of mental
state involved in fraud: the purpose to deceive and the level of fault
with respect to the falsity of the relevant representation. As a result,
the courts of appeals have all said that recklessness can satisfy the
scienter requirement. Those courts also have too frequently failed to
distinguish between: (1) the two levels of mental state involved in
fraud—an actor’s purpose and her fault with respect to falsity—and
(2) the two forms of recklessness—conscious-disregard recklessness
126
and super-negligence recklessness. As I discussed in Part I.C.3,
conscious-disregard recklessness is a form of knowledge, whereas
super-negligence recklessness is a form of fault that does not involve
awareness.

124. Id.; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (declining to address the same
question).
125. See, e.g., Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2001) (defining
recklessness in the super-negligence sense, that is, as “an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care,” and stating that recklessness is sufficient to make out scienter (quoting Bryant
v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 n.18 (11th Cir. 1999))); In re Phillips Petrol. Sec.
Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We have also recognized that recklessness on the
part of a defendant meets the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” (citing
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980))); Joseph A. Grundfest
& A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 651 (2002) (“Since [Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976),] every court of appeals that has addressed the issue has
held that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement of Section 10(b).”).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Precision Med. Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 446 (2d Cir. 1978)
(“The phrases ‘reckless disregard of whether the statements made were true’ and ‘conscious
purpose to avoid learning the truth’ mean essentially the same thing.” (quoting United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 882 (2d Cir. 1972))); United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101–02
(2d Cir. 1977) (noting that trial courts have confused the concepts of reckless indifference and
conscious avoidance); Slakoff v. United States, 8 F.2d 9, 10 (3d Cir. 1925) (“If he did not do this,
but acted with such gross carelessness and indifference to the truth of the representations
contained in the statements as to warrant the conclusion that he acted fraudulently, then his
conviction may stand.”).
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A further complication remains. As has been heavily
documented, the class action dominates the modern industry of
127
private securities litigation, and almost no cases go to trial. The
critical action lies in pleading, motions to dismiss, and settlement
negotiations that are conducted in the shadow of pleading
128
requirements and standards of review for dismissal. Seeking to
reduce the expenses arising out of weak or meritless cases, Congress
updated the ’34 Act with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
129
of 1995 (PSLRA). Under the PSLRA, private plaintiffs must satisfy
a heightened pleading standard with respect to the element of
130
scienter. The Supreme Court has held that to satisfy this statutory
pleading standard, plaintiffs must allege specific facts that give rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required scienter,
meaning an inference “at least as compelling” as any other inference
131
available from the facts in the complaint.
The Court did not, in its decision on pleading, revisit the
question of what mental state, if any, suffices for scienter—though the
decision confusingly talked about the issue as the standard required
132
to support an inference of “fraudulent intent.” The courts of
appeals have since held that the new pleading rule in the PSLRA
does not alter their prior rulings holding that a showing of
133
recklessness suffices.

127. See STEPHANIE PLANCICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING,
RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2009 YEAR-END UPDATE 9–13
(2009) (providing statistical data on the promulgation and settlement rates of private securities
class action suits); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 418 (2005) (“Settlements
are the end game for securities class action suits. . . . [S]everal hundred securities class actions
are settled annually, [but] fewer than one or two securities class action suits are tried in any
year.”).
128. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 238–40, 246–48, (2d ed. 2008); see also, e.g., In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig., 705 F. Supp.
2d 367, 398–401 (D.N.J. 2010) (conducting an analysis of whether scienter had been established
under the standard of proof required at the pleading stage).
129. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
131. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007).
132. Id. at 2504.
133. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199–201 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
PSLRA did not address the substantive definition of scienter.”); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190
F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The PSLRA did not change . . . the kind of evidence a plaintiff
must adduce to demonstrate scienter . . . [b]ut . . . the PSLRA does seek to heighten the
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Where does that leave matters? Under existing law, plaintiffs in
civil securities fraud actions may sue for merely reckless conduct of
the super-negligence variety. That is, a plaintiff could seek damages
under Rule 10b-5 on the ground that an actor issued a factually
untrue material statement, was unaware of the untruth, and was
unaware due to such extreme carelessness that she should have
134
known that the representation was not true.
I do not know whether the majority of securities fraud class
actions, or even a substantial portion of them, involve only such
conduct. Usually plaintiffs plead multiple theories, including both a
scheme to defraud and the making of misrepresentations and/or
omissions. Typically, plaintiffs allege both that the defendant knew of
an untruth and that she recklessly disregarded the question of

standard for pleading scienter . . . .”); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1281–84
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e hold that the [PSLRA] does not prohibit the practice of alleging scienter
by pleading facts that denote severe recklessness, the standard previously approved of by this
Circuit . . . .”); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549–52 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is clear
that Congress changed the pleading, but not the state of mind, requirements applicable to
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases.”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532–35 (3d Cir.
1999) (“[W]e believe [the PSLRA] was intended to modify procedural requirements while
leaving substantive law undisturbed.”). Interestingly, courts disagree over whether a pleading
based on facts about the defendant’s “motive and opportunity” to commit fraud can be
sufficient to clear the scienter hurdle. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564
F.3d 242, 276–79 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the three different standards applied by the various
circuits to determine whether a plaintiff sufficiently pled scienter under the PSLRA).
134. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at 297, In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., No. 1:04CV-1639 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2006) (“These Defendants knew, or should have known in the
exercise of reasonable care, that their statements regarding the Company’s financial statements,
accounting policies and practices, and internal financial controls during the Loss Period were
materially false and misleading.”); Second Consolidated Amended Complaint at 7, In re Tommy
Hilfiger Sec. Litig., No. 1:04-CV-07678-RO (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2004) (“[D]efendants . . . were
aware, or recklessly disregarded, that the false and misleading statements were being issued
regarding the Company, and approved or ratified these statements, in violation of the federal
securities laws.”); see also 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3688–89
(3d rev. ed. 2004) (warning against the tendency of a definition of recklessness such as, for
example, “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care” to slide too close to
allowing liability for negligence (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th
Cir. 1977))); Milich, supra note 28, at 180–81 (criticizing courts for allowing “a negligence-like
standard” to creep back into the law of securities fraud under the mantle of recklessness). Even
a leading case that stressed the importance of recklessness’s being “the functional equivalent of
intent” defined it in negligence-like terms: “[T]he danger of misleading buyers must be actually
known or so obvious that any reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing . . . . [This
definition] measures conduct against an external standard which, under the circumstances of a
given case, results in the conclusion that the reckless man should bear the risk of his omission.”
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).

BUELL IN PRINTER PROOF

552

11/11/2011 5:38:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:511

135

falsity. Because these cases nearly always settle before summary
judgment, much less trial, measuring the proportion of cases in which
the plaintiff could prove only recklessness is probably impossible. In
addition, some courts say that “should have known” is not enough
and that recklessness requires a knowing disregard of a substantial
136
risk that the relevant representation was false.
Finally, the
demanding pleading standard with respect to scienter means that
facts sufficient to raise a “strong inference” often are also the kinds of
137
facts that suggest more than mere recklessness.
The point is only that Rule 10b-5 and its doctrine permit lawsuits
for conduct beyond core fraud. The Supreme Court has said that
Section 10 of the ’34 Act is “a catchall provision, but [that] what it
138
catches must be fraud.” But if the Court permits recklessness to
establish scienter, then the “fraud” that Section 10 catches is not the
kind of fraud that requires a deceptive actor. This is odd in light of
the Court’s determination that the language of Section 10 of the ’34
Act, which speaks of “manipulation” and “deception,” limits the
139
reach of Rule 10b-5.
That the insurance market recognizes and even welcomes this
contradiction reveals the lack of conceptual coherence in this area of
law. The directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) insurance policies
purchased by all American corporations routinely exclude—for moral
hazard, historical, and other reasons—coverage for what the industry
140
calls “real fraud,” by which it means, roughly, intentional fraud.

135. See, e.g., [Corrected] Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at A-55,
In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 99 CIV. 2447 JFK, 2000 WL 91939 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2000), rev’d, 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “defendants knew, or were reckless in not
knowing,” that the rate of return for certain book titles was rising).
136. See, e.g., Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127–28 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant “should have known” the relevant facts were
insufficient to allege recklessness in a private action for securities fraud).
137. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504–05 (“To qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of
§ 21D(b)(2), we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or
reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent.”).
138. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
139. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
173–74 (1994) (“[T]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with ‘device or
contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct.” (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
140. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 186–87 (2010).
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Meanwhile, the fact that private liability can be established based on
recklessness—and the fact that almost all suits settle—allows insurers
to pay claims for securities fraud liability without admitting to
covering real fraud, even in cases in which real fraud was committed
and ultimately could have been proven.
This slippage sustains the status quo in the existing market for
D&O policies and gives plaintiffs good reason to rely on ample
141
allegations of recklessness when pleading and settling fraud suits.
Maybe this state of affairs is beneficial for the D&O insurance
market, and maybe what is good for that market is good for
everyone—those are inquiries beyond the ambitions and competence
of this Article—but the situation appears, at the least, to be juryrigged.
2. SEC Actions. The SEC navigates even murkier waters on the
matter of scienter. Unlike private plaintiffs, the SEC can bring actions
142
under both Rule 10b-5 and Section 17. Because the two provisions
use almost identical language, the availability of both options might
not seem important. But the Supreme Court has made it important by
holding that negligence is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement
143
of at least one portion of Section 17.
The argument goes like this: The scope of Rule 10b-5 is limited
by its enabling statute, Section 10 of the ’34 Act, which applies only to
144
“manipulative and deceptive device[s] and contrivance[s].” Section
17, unlike Rule 10b-5, is a statute, with no limitation beyond its own
language. Because the second of Section 17’s three prongs talks about
misstatements of fact rather than the sort of “fraud,” “manipulation,”
or “schemes” named in its other two prongs, the statute’s second
145
prong should be read to sanction the careless misleading of others.
This argument hardly seems to harmonize these two provisions of
securities regulation, a fact that is particularly noteworthy given that
146
Rule 10b-5 was virtually copied from Section 17.

141. Id. at 187–88.
142. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
143. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
144. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
145. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691–97. This reading, of course, raises the question why the Court
has not found the parallel second prong of Rule 10b-5 to be invalid as exceeding the SEC’s
rulemaking authority under Section 10 of the ’34 Act.
146. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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The result is that the SEC is able to bring enforcement actions
for securities fraud without having to specify whether its grievance is
that the defendant committed fraud in the sense of real deceit, or
merely that she acted carelessly in important matters involving other
people’s money. The SEC’s complaints routinely allege violations of
both Rule 10b-5 and Section 17 and often use allegation language like
“the defendant knew or should have known” or “was aware or must
147
have been aware.” These cases—though not subject to the special
pleading rules for private lawsuits—also almost uniformly settle. And
they usually settle under terms in which the defendant “neither
148
admits nor denies” the wrongdoing alleged in the SEC’s complaint.
Thus, the public almost never learns—and the SEC almost never has
to decide—whether the defendant committed core fraud or merely
some form of misrepresentation.
To return to the Goldman Sachs case, the SEC alleged that
Goldman “negligently” violated Section 17 and that it “knowingly or
149
recklessly” violated Rule 10b-5. Then, following a hue and cry
150
about whether Goldman had committed a major fraud, the case
settled without a trial or any admission of wrongdoing, and with
Goldman agreeing to a permanent injunction that covered violations
151
of Section 17 but did not mention Rule 10b-5. Did Goldman plan to
deceive the buyer by hiding the people and methods it had used to
select the feeble mortgages supporting the securities products it sold?
Or was Goldman merely careless, or grossly careless, about whether
the buyer had been misled? Was this buyer even misled? These
answers are unavailable not only because the case settled but also
because the law permitted the SEC to investigate and file its case
152
without committing to any of these theories.

147. See, e.g., Complaint at 6, SEC v. Noncek, No. 09-CV-02387 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2009);
Complaint at 6, SEC v. Queri, No. 08CV01367 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008); Complaint at 2, SEC v.
Pliner, No. 07-CV-00495 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2007).
148. See Buell, supra note 7, at 89.
149. Complaint, supra note 2, at 21.
150. See supra notes 1–5.
151. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 8, at 1.
152. The Dodd-Frank legislation promises to make the matter more opaque. It includes a
provision that authorizes the SEC to proceed against persons who “recklessly” aid and abet the
securities fraud violations of others. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929O, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. IV
2011)). The idea of reckless accessorial liability is even more elusive than the idea of reckless
fraud. It is black-letter criminal law that, with few exceptions, one cannot aid another in
committing an offense without intending for the offense to succeed. JOSHUA DRESSLER,
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The SEC’s Enforcement Division thus routinely exercises
sanctioning authority over conduct that extends potentially well
beyond a conception of fraud based in purposeful deception. Though
the SEC talks about policing securities fraud when it uses both
153
Section 17 and Rule 10b-5, it may be policing something quite
different, such as conduct that causes losses to investors. Such an
enforcement program might be beneficial, but its merits have not
been sufficiently discussed, either now or at the births of the ’33 and
’34 Acts and Rule 10b-5.
3. Criminal Prosecutions. Alas, the situation is worse in criminal
actions. One might think that the law would be clearer because the
criminal sphere is the one place with statutory guidance on mental
state. Section 32 of the ’34 Act and Section 24 of the ’33 Act state that
anyone who “willfully” violates any provision of the Acts can be fined
154
and imprisoned. These sections seem to imply a heightened mental
state requirement for criminal penalties.
But these statutory provisions have a major problem. In an
instance of poor foresight, the drafters of the ’33 and ’34 Acts
adopted criminal culpability standards that apply in blanket fashion
to all of the Acts’ conduct rules and regulations. The Acts and their
corresponding regulations contain voluminous and highly diverse
provisions. These range from picayune filing requirements to serious
155
prohibitions on fraud and market manipulation. The drafters of the
’34 Act seem to have glimpsed this problem because they included a
provision in Section 32 stating that imprisonment may not be imposed

UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 477–82 (5th ed. 2009). Helping another in a particular
endeavor is a goal-oriented behavior. And criminal law does not exculpate accomplices who fail
to succeed in their efforts to assist criminal ventures. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(3) (1962)
(imposing attempt liability on a person who acts as an accomplice to a person who did not
successfully complete a planned crime). A reckless state of mind does not suffice for accomplice
liability because it is nonsensical to speak, for example, of a person consciously disregarding the
risk that her work as a lookout might help a bank robber escape. She is either acting as a
lookout in the hopes that he will get away, or she is not a lookout at all.
153. See, e.g., SEC Charges Securities Fraud in Internet Foreign Currency Trading Scheme,
Litigation Release No. 16,055, 69 SEC Docket 287 (Feb. 8, 1999); SEC Charges Investment
Adviser with Securities Fraud, Litigation Release No. 15,988, 68 SEC Docket 1998 (Nov. 30,
1998).
154. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006).
155. Compare, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), with, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.164 (2011).
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on anyone who proves that she did not have knowledge of the rule
156
she has been criminally charged with violating.
This state of affairs has bedeviled the courts. For two reasons,
“willfully” cannot mean “knowing that one is breaking the securities
laws.” First, if the government had to prove knowledge of the law to
establish a willful violation, defendants would have no need for the
statutory partial defense that allows one to avoid prison by proving
157
lack of knowledge of the relevant rule. Statutes are to be read, when
158
possible, to avoid redundancy. Second, ignorance of the law
159
generally does not excuse serious criminal offenses, including fraud.
It would severely hamper the law of securities fraud if defendants
were permitted to argue that they did not know that fraud in
connection with securities transactions was illegal, or even that they
did not know that their particular conduct counted as securities fraud
in the eyes of the law—especially given the rapid evolution of
financial products.
The Supreme Court has never identified the scienter required for
a criminal conviction for securities fraud. The lower federal courts
160
have issued dozens of opinions making a mess of the matter.
Depending on which federal court one asks—and when one asks—a

156. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32. The ’33 Act has no parallel language, which is
surprising, given that the ’33 Act’s rules are often more arcane than those of the ’34 Act. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 24.
157. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004).
158. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
159. United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2009); Tarallo, 380 F.3d at
1185–88; United States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1451–52 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Knueppel, 293 F. Supp. 2d 199,
203 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Some courts, however, have permitted a defendant, at least under the
strict terms of the statute, to argue an affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of the existence
of Rule 10b-5, though I know of no case in which such an argument has been successful. See
United States v. Behrens, 644 F.3d 754, 755 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a defendant was
entitled to a defense that he had no knowledge of Rule 10b-5 and remanding to the district
court to determine whether he had met his burden of proof); see also Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (noting the “venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is
no defense” before holding that “Congress may decree otherwise” in particular contexts, such as
the regulatory crime of structuring financial transactions); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,
199–200 (1991) (noting the same principle before finding that Congress has created a mistakeof-law defense in limited contexts, including the nonpayment of taxes); Dan M. Kahan,
Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 145–49
(1997) (describing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), as providing an ignorance
defense solely for honest mistakes that violate laws not backed by moral norms).
160. For a longer tour through the particulars of many of these cases, see Seigel, supra note
28, at 1590–98.
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criminal conviction for securities fraud might require (from the most
to the least demanding rule):
1. willfulness, which means awareness that one is doing
161
162
something wrongful but not necessarily illegal;
2. specific intent to defraud, which means a purpose to
163
mislead;
3. specific intent to defraud, which includes knowledge of
the falsity of the relevant representation, willful
blindness as to its falsity, or deliberate disregard as to
164
the risk of its falsity;
4. specific intent to defraud, which includes acting
recklessly under circumstances in which the defendant
“should have known” or “must have known” of the risk
165
that the relevant representation was false;
5. specific intent to defraud, which includes acting
recklessly, with the meaning of recklessness
166
undefined;
167
6. just knowledge;
7. just recklessness, with no apparent distinction between
the level of scienter required for criminal and civil
168
liability; or

161. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 567–70 (2d Cir. 2010); Reyes, 577 F.3d at 1079–80;
United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1970).
162. United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 914–15 (9th Cir. 1996).
163. United States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d 194, 199–200 (9th Cir. 1970); Rice v. United States,
149 F.2d 601, 603 (10th Cir. 1945).
164. United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Mackay,
491 F.2d 616, 623 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 363–64 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1964).
165. United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Natelli,
527 F.2d 311, 320–23 (2d Cir. 1975).
166. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188–89 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1501–02 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634, 638 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 1971); Elbel v. United States,
364 F.2d 127, 133–34 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Goyal, No. CR 04-00201 MJJ, 2008 WL
755010, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008); United States v. Cen-Card Agency/C.C.A.C., 724 F.
Supp. 313, 316–17 (D.N.J. 1989); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
167. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. at 711–12.
168. United States v. Gutstein, No. 91-50704, 1992 WL 354151, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 30,
1992); Williams v. United States, No. 92-1110, 1992 WL 332029, at *3 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 1992);
United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59–60 (3d Cir. 1982); Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d
826, 828 (10th Cir. 1968); see also United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1976)
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8. albeit rarely, simply failure of due care.
Many of these opinions rely on a long line of cases interpreting
the federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes that—alarmingly—also
170
hold that recklessness can “establish” the specific intent to defraud.
And many of these opinions elide the distinction between the
evidentiary and constitutive questions discussed in Part I, never
making clear whether an actor’s recklessness can be viewed as simply
making it more likely that she had a purpose to deceive or as
171
substituting fully for the intent to defraud.

(stating that the law of Rule 10b-5 does not vary in civil and criminal contexts except as to the
government’s burden of proof).
169. United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962); Stone v. United States, 113
F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940); see also United States v. Meyer, 359 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a defendant cannot prevail on a good-faith defense to a securities fraud charge “if
he could have ascertained the true facts by the exercise of that degree of care expected of a
reasonably prudent person”).
170. United States v. Isaiah, 434 F.3d 513, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Munoz,
233 F.3d 1117, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir.
1997); United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 664–65 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Coyle,
63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Reddick, 22 F.3d 1504, 1507–08 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 326–27 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mann, 884
F.2d 532, 535–36 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Woods, 877 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185,
187 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1157–
58 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Reicen, 497 F.2d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755, 756 (10th Cir.
1965); Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1964); Babson v. United States, 330
F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1964); Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1926); Slakoff v.
United States, 8 F.2d 9, 10 (3d Cir. 1925); Corliss v. United States, 7 F.2d 455, 456–57 (8th Cir.
1925); Kaplan v. United States, 229 F. 389, 389 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 897 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583,
588–89 (E.D. Pa. 1957). But see United States v. Precision Med. Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 445–46
(2d Cir. 1978) (stating that recklessness suffices to establish the mental state for mail fraud only
if it rises to the level of “conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth”). The nadir in this line of
cases might be this formulation: “In order to convict, the jury [is] required to find not only the
presence of ‘reckless indifference’ in the making of the statements in question, but that [the
statements] were made with ‘intent to defraud.’ Though the definitions are faintly circular, they
present the concept fairly.” United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 1983); see also
United States v. Themy, 624 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1980) (providing the ipse dixit that
“indifference to the truth of statements made to induce others to action amounts to fraudulent
intent” (emphasis added)); United States v. Quadro Corp., 928 F. Supp. 688, 696 (E.D. Tex.
1996) (stating that the elements of mail fraud include both intent to defraud and knowledge or
recklessness as to falsity, but later stating that “[i]f specific intent cannot be proven, the
government must show that the defendants ‘made material misrepresentations of fact with
reckless disregard to their truth or falsity’” (quoting Cen-Card Agency, 724 F. Supp. at 316–17)).
171. See, e.g., Boyer, 694 F.2d at 59–60; United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 320–24 (2d
Cir. 1975); Henderson, 446 F.2d at 966; Elbel, 364 F.2d at 133–34; Stone, 113 F.2d at 75; see also
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As far as I have been able to discover, the courts have made
virtually no effort to distinguish between the goal-oriented mental
state involved in a defendant’s purpose to deceive and the
knowledge-based mental state involved in a defendant’s awareness of
the falsity of her representation or the tendency of her conduct or
omission to mislead. Nor have the courts made much effort to
distinguish among forms of recklessness. The elements have been
confused to the point that courts sometimes simply say that
recklessness establishes intent—which is nonsensical and, for criminal
172
lawyers, as unpleasant as the sound of fingernails on a chalkboard.
Although I doubt prosecutors deliberately take on such cases,
the result is that a person can be convicted and imprisoned for
securities fraud in the United States on the theory that she was very

Prows, 118 F.3d at 692 (implying, in a mail fraud case, that specific intent to defraud can be
inferred from recklessness as to falsity); United States v. Hoffman, 918 F.2d 44, 46–47 (6th Cir.
1990) (suggesting, in a bank fraud case, that recklessness can equate to specific intent to defraud
because it is evidence of intent); United States v. Welch, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070–71 (D. Utah
2001) (stating, in a mail fraud case, that a scheme to defraud requires intent but that
indifference to truth can be evidence of intent); 8 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 134, at 3676–77
(suggesting that recklessness has grown in importance in the law of scienter as it has been relied
upon as a way of inferring the intent to defraud).
172. See 8 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 134, at 3676–77 (stating that intent to defraud has
“taken on a coloration of recklessness” in some of the case law). New York’s famous securities
antifraud statute, the Martin Act, is even broader than the federal scheme in its statutory
language; serves as an all-purpose tool for civil, regulatory, and criminal liability; and has
produced judicial fogginess about fault standards and the distinction between fraud and
misrepresentation. Engaging in “[a]ny fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false
pretense or fictitious or pretended purchase or sale” or making “[a]ny promise or
representation as to the future which is beyond reasonable expectation or unwarranted by
existing circumstances” is a misdemeanor violation of the Martin Act. Martin Act § 1, N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c(1) (McKinney 1996). But felony liability attaches only if one
“intentionally engages in any scheme constituting a systematic ongoing course of conduct with
intent to defraud ten or more persons or to obtain property from ten or more persons by false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.” Id. § 5; see also, e.g., People v. Landes, 645
N.E.2d 716, 717–18 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that the Martin Act covers conduct “which, in some
instances, may be criminal because deceptive or misleading even absent proof of scienter or
intent”); People v. Rachmani, 525 N.E.2d 704, 707–08 (N.Y. 1988) (stating that in an injunctive
action, the Martin Act imposes strict liability for all deceitful practices); People v. Federated
Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926) (stating that the Martin Act covers “all deceitful
practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty”); People v. Sala, 695 N.Y.S.2d 169, 177
(App. Div. 1999) (stating that intent to defraud is necessary for a felony conviction under the
Martin Act, but then stating that intent can be inferred from knowledge and that intent means
simply “an intentional act constituting fraud,” defined as including all “deceitful practices”);
People v. Tellier, 155 N.Y.S.2d 245, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (stating that negligence is sufficient for
civil liability under the Martin Act); People v. Photocolor Corp., 281 N.Y.S. 130, 137 (Sup. Ct.
1935) (stating that “something less than legal fraud will suffice to invoke the injunctive powers
of the Martin Act”).
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careless about whether what she did or said might mislead another
person to his detriment. This possibility ought to, at a minimum,
provoke serious controversy. Lengthy prison sentences for financial
crimes involving only negligence, gross negligence, or even consciousdisregard recklessness swim against a considerable tide of cases
insisting on knowledge or intent for white-collar and regulatory crime
173
offenses carrying significant prison sentences.
The best that can be said for the state of the doctrine is that these
scienter distinctions do not matter in most cases. One might argue
that what the courts really mean when they talk about recklessness is
not something constitutive about fraud but is rather an evidentiary
point: a prosecutor is permitted to argue in a securities fraud case that
facts showing a defendant’s indifference to the truth of her
representations tend to support the inference that she intended to
deceive the listener. But this assertion might not be true in all cases.
The argument therefore treads on dangerous ground, potentially
opening the door to converting the evidentiary point into a
constitutive change in the crime of fraud.
The only way to guard against this kind of leakage—if one even
believes such measures are effective—would be with a jury
instruction of a type that I do not believe is given in securities fraud
cases. The jury would need to be told something like: “If you find that
the defendant consciously disregarded a risk that her representation
was false, you may consider that fact as evidence with respect to the
question whether she specifically intended to defraud the victim; but
you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the purpose to
deceive, not merely that she was indifferent to a risk that the victim
174
would be misled.”

173. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (“[W]e must construe the
statute in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some
mens rea for a crime is fairly embedded.” (citation omitted)). See generally Joseph E. Kennedy,
Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753 (2002) (demonstrating how the
Supreme Court has increasingly required proof of higher levels of mens rea in the area of
regulatory crimes as statutory and guidelines punishments for those crimes have increased).
174. See Milich, supra note 28, at 186–89 (distinguishing, in the securities fraud context,
between the evidentiary approach to recklessness, which uses it as a way of concluding that the
defendant was subjectively at fault, and the disjunctive approach, which allows complete
substitution of objective recklessness for a finding of subjective fault); Seigel, supra note 28, at
1605–10 (arguing, in the securities fraud context, the importance of distinguishing the use of an
actor’s recklessness as an evidentiary matter from its use as the substantive standard of ultimate
liability).
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D. Insider Trading
Before turning to normative implications, a few words about the
special but prevalent problem of insider trading are necessary. Most
175
insider trading has not been banned by statutes and regulations. It
176
is, by judicial construction of Rule 10b-5, a form of securities fraud.
The law of insider trading is thus also vulnerable to the problems
associated with sloppy thinking about the concept of fraud.
The fit between insider trading and securities fraud is famously
177
awkward. Many scholars believe that insider trading ought to be
178
prohibited, but this view is by no means universal. This Article,
which aims to improve understanding of the relationship between
fraud and securities fraud, has no stake in that contest. The question
relevant to this Article is how restrictions on insider trading fit within
179
general antifraud rules and on which conception of fraud they stand.

175. But see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1 to -2 (2011) (codifying certain aspects of insider trading
doctrine and providing certain safe harbors).
176. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 128, at 354–66.
177. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 889 (2010) (“[D]ealing with insider trading
through an antifraud rule is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”).
178. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although informational
disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their
capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked
by law.”); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Who would knowingly roll
the dice in a crooked crap game?” (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). The standard arguments for and
against insider trading prohibitions are reviewed—and supplemented with an argument that
these prohibitions enhance the quality of corporate governance—in James D. Cox, Insider
Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628. See
also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of
the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 444 (2001) (“[N]either the courts, the
legislature, nor the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has clearly or convincingly
articulated what social policy the insider trading prohibition is meant to further . . . .”); Henry
G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J.
CORP. L. 167, 167 (2005) (“This Article briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of
insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets,
harm to individual investors, and executive compensation.”); M. Todd Henderson, Insider
Trading and CEO Pay 3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 521,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1605170 (“[T]here is a missing piece to the pay
debate—the compensation insiders implicitly receive through the ability to convert their equity
into cash. This Paper provides new evidence that the size of the insider-trading component of
implicit compensation is significant . . . .”).
179. See Hazen, supra note 177, at 887 (“The federal securities laws’ primary weapon against
insider trading is the general antifraud Rule 10b-5.”).
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Insider trading is a type of nondisclosure fraud that is situated
along the context axis, axis (a), explained in Part I. The seller/buyer
defrauds her counterparty in a trade by not disclosing that she has
advantageous inside information—and that her decision to trade is
based on that information—when the information is of a type that the
180
counterparty would not expect her to exploit. The insider trading
prohibition is often described as a “disclose or abstain” rule because
there is no deception, and thus no fraud, if the seller/buyer tells her
counterparty about the particular inside information she uses to
181
trade.
Saying that insider trading is a form of nondisclosure fraud does
not make much headway. The problem with treating nondisclosure as
fraud is deciding under what circumstances nondisclosure is
deceptive. Economic exchange is full of perfectly acceptable
information disparities. “Disclose everything you know” would be a
silly and disastrous rule for any market. Moreover, to say that
disclosure is required when one has a duty to disclose is conclusory.
Legal duties exist as a result of normative decisions to advance
particular objectives.
The problem in insider trading law has been specifying the scope
182
of the duty to disclose. A duty to disclose all informational
advantages before trading would sweep too broadly. There is not, and
should not be, a right of equal knowledge in securities markets, where
industrious actors should be encouraged and rewarded. Insider
trading law aims at a sometimes difficult-to-specify category of unfair,
183
inefficient, or otherwise-undesirable informational advantages. It is
good when a trader does research to gain an advantage. It is bad
180. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[S]ilence in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) . . . . But such
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction.”).
181. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911
(Nov. 8, 1961) (“If . . . disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or
unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.”).
182. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–33 (reversing the insider trading conviction of an
employee of a financial printer based on the theory that he used information acquired at work
to purchase stock because such a theory would impose a duty upon such persons to the market
as a whole).
183. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (“In an inside-trading case . . . fraud derives
from the ‘inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage’ of ‘information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” (quoting
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43 SEC Docket
933, 936 (Nov. 25, 1968))).
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when a corporate insider gains an advantage simply from having seen
a document or having sat in a meeting at which she learned about a
deal before the public did. Because I do not aim to resolve the
normative debate about insider trading prohibitions, I will not pursue
the question here of how one might justify distinctions between good
184
and bad informational advantages.
Fraud, of course, still requires a theory of deception. Frauds
involving nondisclosure typically deceive by taking advantage of a
victim’s expectations and assumptions. The victim acts on the basis of
a reasonable assumption that the undisclosed facts do not exist—for
example, a buyer purchases a house assuming the seller would have
disclosed a particular defect if it existed. In the case of insider trading,
the nondisclosure is deceptive because the counterparty assumes that
the trader does not have a particular kind of informational advantage,
such as a corporate secret about an upcoming transaction. Or, in the
common scenario of highly liquid, faceless markets, the counterparty
assumes that the market is relatively free of such traders.
This theory is oddly circular. Why would the counterparty
assume that the seller/buyer is not trading on the basis of an
informational advantage in the form of nonpublic knowledge
acquired as a result of her insider position? Because robust legal
prohibitions on insider trading in securities markets now exist, so
people are not supposed to do that! The law itself has created the
conditions that justify its treatment of insider trading as fraud.
Despite this oddity, the argument for insider trading as a form of
fraud has some merit. Fraud is an evolving concept that is contingent
on changing social and market norms. Whether conduct is deceptive
depends on the expectations that market participants justifiably bring
to particular kinds of transactions. People expect disclosure in a
lawyer’s or investment manager’s office, but not necessarily at a usedcar lot. At this point, the norm against insider trading is so entrenched
in the United States that people are justified in assuming that it is not

184. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (“An investor’s
informational disadvantage vis-á-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information
stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or
skill.”); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1331, 1373–78 (2009) (arguing that misappropriation cases, in which existing
law treats the conduct as fraud on the person or entity from whom the information is improperly
acquired and then used, are better treated as cases of fraud on the trading counterparty, due to
the unfair advantage gained from the use of information that has been stolen or otherwise
improperly obtained).

BUELL IN PRINTER PROOF

564

11/11/2011 5:38:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:511

happening when they go to buy or sell a security—or at least that it is
happening infrequently and illegitimately.
Insider trading also works conceptually as a core form of fraud
involving purposeful deceit. If the actor has the purpose to deceive
when trading on the basis of an illegitimate informational advantage,
then she is defrauding her counterparty. If she is merely reckless as to
whether she has an illegitimate informational advantage, then she is
perhaps misleading her counterparty, but she is not defrauding her
counterparty in the core sense of fraud.
It is therefore equally a mistake in the insider trading context as
elsewhere in securities fraud to say something like what the Supreme
Court said when it stated this rule:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material non-public information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
185
should know that there has been a breach.

If one can commit insider trading by merely being careless as to
whether one is making improper use of information in a way that
misleads one’s counterparty, then the legal wrong of insider trading is
186
not a form of core fraud but rather is a form of misrepresentation.
E. Securities Fraud Remains Undefined
This brief tour of positive law yields the conclusion that the delict
of securities fraud remains undefined. The cause of action can result
in private civil, civil regulatory, or criminal liability. It sounds in law
and equity. It can lead to damages, fines, restitution, injunctions, or
imprisonment. It can be committed through conduct, statements,
omissions, or “devices” and “schemes.” It can be pursued with a
negligent, reckless, or intentional state of mind.
The law of securities fraud has located itself at expansive points
on nearly every one of the axes of fraud with which I began in Part I:
(a) acts can include mere conduct or omissions; (b) fault can include
forms of negligence; (c) context can include both arm’s-length

185. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added).
186. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Supreme Court strangely added in a footnote
that there must be a purpose to defraud and that the issue in the case was not whether the
insider or tippee acted with scienter “but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent
conduct at all.” Id. at 663 n.23.
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transactions and fiduciary relationships carrying heightened duties of
disclosure; (d) sanction can include all forms of civil, equitable, and
criminal penalties; and (e) harm can include monetary loss and, at
least in SEC and DOJ actions, deprivations of less tangible interests.
Securities fraud is thus a category of legal actions, not a specific
form of wrongdoing. In truth, one cannot “commit securities fraud.”
One can commit any number of transgressions that the law labels
“securities fraud.” Securities fraud is based not on one conception of
fraud but on many available conceptions of fraud. As the next Part
explains, continuing to treat this category as if it were a concept—in
both doctrine and public discourse—inflicts costs that legal reform
can and should ameliorate.
III. IMPROVING THE LAW OF SECURITIES FRAUD
In this final Part, I first ask why anyone should care about what I
have demonstrated: that securities fraud is not a single delict but a
network of causes of action that have not been sufficiently analyzed
independently, only some of which are for core fraud. I argue that the
status quo potentially imposes serious costs in the form of a
disconnect between the legal regime and its basic regulatory
purposes, doctrine that risks criminally sanctioning undeserving
actors, and loss of message clarity in the public sanctioning of fraud in
financial markets. I then identify and briefly assess some modest
options for reform. These take the form of revisions to the statutory
and regulatory schemes governing securities fraud and, pending such
reforms, a series of helpful moves that the federal judiciary could
make in interpreting and applying the existing regime of statutes and
rules.
A. Costs of the Status Quo
Instrumental analysis dominates this field of law, as it should.
Securities regulation is a follow-the-money affair, perhaps all the way
down. Insisting on the doctrine’s conceptual rigor might thus seem
old-fashioned or beside the point. But doing so is instrumentally
important. Lack of clarity about what constitutes securities fraud—
and whether the conduct identified as securities fraud is even fraud—
likely produces three costs.
First, this huge sanctioning machinery is not firmly moored to the
purposes of securities regulation. This lack of clarity about the
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purposes of securities fraud regulation makes achievement or even
measurement of optimal deterrence unlikely.
Second, the lack of conceptual distinctions between civil and
criminal fraud has produced hazy doctrine on mental state. Criminal
sanctions for securities fraud should be reserved for those who
deserve the most blame and for those whose conduct calls for the
most strongly deterrent of sanctions.
Third, a major disconnect exists between public discourse about
financial fraud and what the legal system is doing about it. This gap
makes it unlikely that the existing system of public-private regulation
can answer important public questions about who has done what in
the financial markets, or that it can provide clear instructions to
market actors about the distinctions between acceptable and wrongful
behavior.
Consider an example that is typical of contemporary discussions
in this field. For many years, companies engaged in backdating stock
187
options that had been granted to their employees as compensation.
The value of this kind of option compensation is commonly a function
of the difference between the price of the company’s equity on the
date the options are granted and its price on the date employees
exercise and sell those options. By choosing, for documentation
purposes, grant dates in the past that corresponded with lower market
prices than the prices at the actual time of the grant, companies were
able to provide stock options that were “in the money” from the
start—that is, options that had accrued value even before the
employee began the efforts to improve the company’s performance
188
that options are, in theory, meant to encourage.
Is the backdating of stock options securities fraud? If so, is it
grounds for class action lawsuits, SEC enforcement actions, criminal
189
prosecutions, or all three? Answering these questions intelligibly is
187. David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the
Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 567–70 (2007).
188. See id. at 568 (“[C]ompensatory options vest over time in order to provide retention
incentives and incentives to create long-term value.”).
189. According to the courts and the executive branch, so far at least, the answer has been
“all of the above.” See United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming a
criminal conviction for options backdating); In re Juniper Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 264 F.R.D.
584, 594–95 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting a motion to certify a class action claim challenging
options backdating); SEC v. Berry, 580 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912–13 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (reviewing an
SEC enforcement action brought against a corporate officer for involvement in an optionsbackdating scheme); Indictment at 23–40, United States v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CR-00628NGG-RER (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006) (indicting the chief executive officer of a corporation for
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possible only with clarity about the nature of securities fraud and its
relation to the concept of fraud. In the backdating cases, it would be a
fundamental error to say that backdating is fraud because it involves
lying about dates or falsifying documents. Contractual arrangements
are deemed effective as of handpicked dates all the time—no law
prohibits that. Options can be granted “in the money” if a company
likes. Corporations can compensate their employees by just handing
them cash, or dancing elephants, if they wish.
Determining whether options backdating is fraud requires a
careful analysis of the factual circumstances by someone equipped
with a clear understanding of fraud. When enforcers and courts set
out to do this, one would hope that the law of securities fraud
provides them with appropriate and effective tools. A backdating case
might turn out to be a fraud, for example, if the company’s investors
were led to believe that the firm incentivized its employees by
granting only contemporaneously dated options and if the company
concealed its backdating practices from public view. If one expects an
antifraud regime to target culpable conduct, one would also need a
relevant actor to have participated in this practice with the requisite
degree of mental state.
Without clarity about the nature of securities fraud and its
relationship to the concept of fraud, the law is likely to impose
sanctions inconsistently. In the case of backdating, sanctions might be
imposed without determining whether the problem was, for example,
just that some investors were in the dark about backdating or that
some corporate managers purposely pulled the wool over investors’
eyes by deceiving them about how companies were compensating
their employees. Additionally, individuals who have participated in
backdating practices may be at greater risk of imprisonment, even if
the nature of their participation did not amount to the purposeful
deception, committed with a heightened mental state, that would
justify criminal sanctions. Finally, the public and even policy elites are
likely to be left confused about what backdating is as a financial
practice, how serious of a problem it is for corporate governance, and
whether it is really fraud.

criminal offenses related to options backdating). See generally Steven J. Mintz, Wave of
Lawsuits Follows Stock Options Backdating, LITIG. NEWS, Jan. 2007, at 1 (describing criminal
and SEC enforcement actions targeting the practice of options backdating).
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B. Objectives for Reform
1. Fraud and the Purposes of Securities Regulation.
Unsurprisingly, the same courts that have failed to clarify the
relationship between securities fraud and fraud have supplied fuzzy
dicta about the purposes of the antifraud regime in securities
regulation. If the objective is to deter all material misstatements and
misleading conduct in securities markets, the law might impose
liability without regard to fault. But if so-called crush-out liability is
seen to impose excessive enforcement and potential error costs, the
law might raise the standard for liability to negligence. If, however,
the objective is to deter actors who seek to craft schemes to profit by
deceiving others, the law might impose liability only for core fraud.
In discussing the policies supporting Rule 10b-5, the courts have
190
supplied mostly bromides. To say that the ’33 and ’34 Acts created a
remedial regime designed to deliver transparency in markets and to
go beyond the common law of fraud only leaves important questions
191
about the desirable scope of liability unanswered. Assertions about
the Acts’ purposes tend to appear without much analysis when it is
time to broaden the law and rule for the SEC or the plaintiff, just as
the importance of discouraging strike suits and attracting capital to
markets tends to appear whenever it is time to narrow the law and
190. See 5B JACOBS, supra note 85, § 6:4, at 6-13 (“The sources refer to no less than eight
policies underlying [Rule 10b-5]: (1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access to
information; (3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting
investors; (6) assuring fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations
while compensating victims.”). These constitute an overbroad set of justifications for a rule
imposing sanctions for fraud.
191. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 173
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]o the extent that ‘the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws are not coextensive with common-law doctrines of fraud,’ it is because common-law fraud
doctrines might be too restrictive.” (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
388–89 (1983))); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“Underlying the adoption of
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: ‘There cannot be honest markets
without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon
mystery and secrecy.’ This Court ‘repeatedly has described the fundamental purpose of the Act
as implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.’” (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 731383, at 11 (1934); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 467, 477–78 (1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Herman, 459 U.S. at 382 (“[Section] 10(b) is a ‘catchall’ antifraud
provision . . . .”); id. at 386–87 (“[W]e have repeatedly recognized that securities laws combating
fraud should be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their]
remedial purposes.’” (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963))). But see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[T]he statute must not be
construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve securities
into a violation of § 10(b) . . . .”).
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192

rule for the defendant. A regime described merely as remedial and
construed liberally to protect investors would, without more
guidance, be one that imposed liability for every failure of
193
information delivery.
The American securities laws are a scheme of disclosure
194
regulation, as opposed to one of merit regulation—such as the
system for controlling how pharmaceuticals reach the market—or
education regulation—such as the system for determining who can
practice certain professions. The general idea is to force information
into the open to create investment markets that are informationally
efficient and protective of investors, and that are therefore more
195
attractive to capital.

192. See 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 3418–20 (exploring the relationship between
common-law fraud and securities fraud and stating that the law of securities fraud is meant to be
broader in some respects because securities are “intricate merchandise” but that “[h]ow much
further the statutes go is difficult to say definitely” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 8 (1933))
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare Herman, 459 U.S. at 386 (“The effectiveness of
the broad proscription against fraud in § 10(b) would be undermined if its scope were restricted
by the existence of an express remedy under § 11.”), with Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (“Though
it remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present
boundaries.”).
193. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“[Securities fraud] statutes
make [private] actions available, not to provide investors with broad insurance against market
losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually
cause.”).
194. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1039 (1987) (“The establishment of a disclosure-based
federal securities regulatory system in 1933 can be described as a rejection of the first
indigenous tradition of American securities regulation, the merit-based system prevalent in the
midwestern states, in favor of a disclosure-based system derived from a British model and from
the broader tradition of Progressive disclosure legislation.”). See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89–96 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press 1995) (1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”); JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W.
HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3
(5th ed. 2006) (describing how the federal securities laws were enacted pursuant to “debate on
the merits of a mandatory disclosure system” and explaining that the ’33 Act “embrace[d]”
disclosure as a remedy for the securities abuses of the 1920s); SELIGMAN, supra note 85, at 41–
57 (recounting the history and context of the adoption of the ’33 Act).
195. For differing and nuanced explorations of how securities regulation might achieve some
or all of these objectives, see CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 128, at 22–35; Merritt B. Fox,
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 273–97 (2000); Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J.
711, 714 (2006); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1995); and Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A
Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 675 (2002).
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An effective disclosure system requires four things: (1) disclosure
must be mandatory; (2) mandatorily disclosed information must be
understandable, which usually counsels in favor of uniformity;
(3) information must be correct; and (4) disclosure must be free of
cheating. As with most regulatory systems, sanctions for failing to
meet these requirements will generally be necessary to induce
compliance in each area.
Assuming the substance of what investors need to know is
correctly determined, the first three elements of an effective
disclosure regime are fairly straightforward. Rules must specify what
information has to be disclosed and must clarify that failures to
196
disclose may result in sanctions. Those rules must further specify a
uniform method of disclosure that makes disclosed information
understandable with minimum effort and expense. And to induce
disclosers to take care that information is correct, sanctions must be
197
imposed for disclosure of inaccurate information.
The fourth element of an effective disclosure regime is a
somewhat more complex matter. One might argue that it is
unnecessary: sanctions for inaccurate disclosure are sufficient to
ensure that disclosed information is reliable; the further question of
whether inaccuracy was the product of venal actions is not relevant.
But that is decidedly not the conclusion reached by the architects of
the American system of securities regulation or their legislative,
administrative, and judicial successors.
A pillar of American securities regulation has been the belief
that a failure to sanction fraud severely will induce investors to flee
198
199
for the exits. Economists call this concern a “lemons market.” The
196. Forcing actors to state things on the record may also make them more careful about
telling the truth. See Fox, supra note 195, at 258 (“[T]he habit of engaging in a wide range of
required disclosures may make it harder for a manager to rationalize breaking the disclosure
regulations than to rationalize entering into a questionable transaction that the manager
persuades himself is good for the corporation as well as himself.”).
197. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006) (requiring
public companies to record and disclose information, authorizing the SEC to issue disclosure
rules, and sanctioning violations of disclosure requirements); see also Klass, supra note 119, at
45 (discussing why in some contexts, regulatory systems might justifiably impose liability for
misrepresentations made carelessly or without fault).
198. See Rock, supra note 195, at 686 (“[T]he public and private enforcement machinery of
the securities laws and the combination of criminal and civil liability makes securities disclosures
far more credible than purely contractual representations.”).
199. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 128, at 24 (explaining how a lemons market can
develop from a failure to make honest disclosures); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 195, at
762 n.192 (“A ‘lemons market’ is a market in which asymmetric information exists between
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original drafters of the law of securities fraud expressed it as a
200
concern about cheating in the stock markets. The perceived need
for reform in the 1930s arose not just from the fact that investors
could not get a full view of what was going on but also that they were
highly vulnerable to being cheated—and that they had learned of this
201
vulnerability in the never-to-be-forgotten crash.
If the purpose of imposing liability for securities fraud is to
supply material incentives for accuracy in disclosure, then maybe the
law should impose liability for merely negligent misrepresentations,
202
or perhaps even strict liability for all material inaccuracies. But why
would the law call all violations of such a regime “securities fraud,”
and why would the statutory system combine disclosure mistakes and
schemes designed to cheat investors under a single liability umbrella?
I can think of no good explanation other than the path dependency
that has characterized the development of the law under Rule 10b-5.
If the purpose of imposing liability for securities fraud is, by
contrast, to warrant to investors that markets are reasonably free of
cheating, then one would expect sanctions to be limited to cases of
core fraud, involving purposeful deception—and perhaps also to cases
of conscious recklessness under some circumstances. But nothing
more.
Deterrence analysis is more complex than this, of course. One
has to take many features into account, including enforcement costs,
error rates, whether liability standards function well as an evidentiary
sellers and buyers. Since the buyers are not fully informed as to the quality of the products, they
discount the price of all products.”).
200. See generally MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW
FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED
AMERICAN FINANCE (2010) (recounting the congressional investigation into the causes of the
1929 stock-market crash and related unfair practices on Wall Street).
201. Milich, supra note 28, at 182 (“The primary issue under the statutory scheme is not
whether someone was harmed but whether someone was cheated. The aim of [Section 10(b) of
the ’34 Act] is not to enforce competency in the securities markets, but honesty.”).
202. See Cox, supra note 28, at 571–88 (arguing for interpreting Rule 10b-5 as imposing
liability for negligent conduct and stating that “[t]he ultimate concern in [the Hochfelder case]
should have been whether a negligence standard would fulfill the objectives of the federal
securities laws of assuring the flow of complete, accurate information to investors without
imposing an unreasonable burden upon the conduct of business”); Goshen & Parchomovsky,
supra note 195, at 777–80 (arguing that negligence might be the appropriate fault standard in
cases of securities fraud because, among other reasons, it would reduce litigation costs and cause
managers to take greater care to verify the accuracy of disclosures); id. at 780 (asserting,
somewhat daringly, that “[t]he high-scienter standard of review achieves an efficient balance
because the agency cost problems embodied in the class action mechanism ensure that the
actual standard will slide to the appropriate level—negligence” (footnote omitted)).

BUELL IN PRINTER PROOF

572

11/11/2011 5:38:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:511

matter, institutional problems such as regulatory capture, agency
costs of class action attorneys, and so on. To get all the relevant
considerations working together in a single analysis is a Herculean
task.
My point in this Article is simply that the United States has a
liability regime that has been permitted largely to duck the question
of its purpose within the scheme of securities regulation. Legal actors
constantly talk about the practice of sanctioning securities fraud as if
its purpose were the pursuit of deception in markets. But the law
itself sanctions many forms of disclosure failure. And enforcement
practices usually fail to distinguish among which kinds of disclosure
failure are being pursued.
Even if nothing were to be changed about the law of securities
fraud, the system would profit from a more explicit conversation
about whether the purposes of the regime of securities regulation
counsel in favor of sanctions only for core fraud, for all disclosure
failures, or for some combination of the two—and about whether
sanctioning those various behaviors under a single liability rule makes
sense. Even the academic literature has come to talk about securities
fraud as if it were a single thing with a well-understood meaning,
without sufficient discussion of the layered features of this body of
law or its nebulous and unspecified relationship to the concept of
fraud.
2. The Civil-Criminal Line. On the one hand, I have supplied
dozens of citations to federal appellate decisions that reflect and
approve a state of affairs in which juries are told that they may
criminally convict for fraud if they find that a defendant acted with
reckless disregard to the truth of her representations. On the other
hand, as a former federal prosecutor, it was my experience that
assistant U.S. attorneys, who are generally risk averse, were not
attracted to the idea of bringing white-collar-crime prosecutions in
the absence of good evidence of a defendant’s intentional
wrongdoing. The more typical pattern was to decide to indict the case
only after the investigation had turned up damning evidence of
culpability, and then to ask the trial judge to instruct the jury in a
manner likely to ease the path to conviction. Thus, one cannot know
how many criminal securities fraud convictions involve defendants
who had no more than a reckless state of mind—in either the
conscious-disregard or the super-negligence sense of the term.
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Securities fraud is not manslaughter. The Anglo-American legal
system generally does not impose particularly condemnatory forms of
criminal liability on reckless actors who do not commit violent
203
offenses. Some commentators have argued that the disregard of
others’ interests involved in recklessness—in the conscious-disregard
sense of the concept—is a sufficient measure of blameworthiness to
204
serve as a general justification for criminal fault.
But that is not a view that has held sway in the law of serious
nonviolent crimes in the United States. White-collar and economic
offenses like obstruction of justice, fraud, bribery, extortion, and the
like have generally been defined as requiring some form of specific
intent. Unlike violent crimes, such cases typically raise the question
whether acts that have ambiguous meaning are made criminal by the
205
purpose or goal behind them. For instance, not all thwarting of the
legal process is wrongly motivated obstruction. Not all deception in
markets is fraud. Not all financial dealings with public officials are
bribery. Not all coercive behavior is extortion.
Because only a mens rea inquiry can separate the malign from
the benign in many such instances, that inquiry must be exacting
enough to bear the full weight of the criminal process. In the context
of securities fraud—in which the enforcement system is selecting and
identifying bad actors in markets that are vital to the American
economic engine—insisting that the standard for criminal fault be
both high and clear and that it be closely tethered to a conception of
genuine core fraud seems uncontroversial.
3. Capitalizing on Expressive Capital. The idea of fraud has been
centrally important to public discourse about the economy, and never
more so than in the wake of the largest cataclysm in the markets since
the Great Depression. The law of securities fraud is the 800-pound
gorilla of antifraud law. When lawyers call something securities fraud,
especially when referencing a high-profile case, they are shaping the
social conception of fraud. Fraud not only constitutes legal doctrine, it
also has an expressive power that can determine norms and
203. For a different view, see Seigel, supra note 28, at 1613.
204. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 23–68 (2009) (examining recklessness as a basis
for criminal liability).
205. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 30–47 (contrasting determinations of mens rea,
harmfulness, and moral wrongfulness in the context of conventional crime versus white-collar
crime).
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behavior. That expressive force flows, in complex fashion, from
both the doctrine and the public discourse about fraud. Such a potent
instrument should be maintained carefully.
It is my general impression that many who manage firms,
represent them, investigate them, sue and prosecute them, and report
on their affairs also believe that prominent cases of public
enforcement have a major impact on understandings of and attitudes
toward fraud. But empirical evidence of such a dynamic, or the lack
thereof, would be difficult to extract from the complex social and
economic web in which actors form beliefs about which behaviors are
207
seriously wrong and how the legal system treats those behaviors.
Professor Donald Langevoort argues that Rule 10b-5’s fluid
quality—its “wobble”—has been a virtue because American society’s
understanding of the relationship between investors and markets is
208
both evolving and suffused with shortages of empirical information.
According to Langevoort, the malleable law of securities fraud has

206. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2000) (“[E]xpressive norms regulate actions . . . .”);
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 519
(2006) (“[Expressive theorists] have asserted that the imposition of . . . criminal liability
expresses important values even if it cannot inflict sanctions that differ materially from civil
penalties.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 352 (1997) (“[I]f the expressive significance of one form of punishment (say, imprisonment)
more effectively expresses community disapprobation than does another one (say, fines or
community service), the effect of the former in directing social influence may justify selecting it
even if the latter imposes the same price on crime at a lesser social cost.”); Richard H.
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) (“Because
people are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signaled by
legislation and other law affects their behavior.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996) (exploring “how legal ‘statements’ might be
designed to change social norms”). But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000) (arguing that expressive theories of
law, properly understood, are not persuasive).
207. It is suggestive, however, that there is clear evidence that initial media reports of fraud
affect the market’s assessment of a firm’s value long before legal proceedings resolve the
question of liability. See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual
Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1047–50 (2007) (finding that investor outflow is greater
when a scandal that harms investors is first discovered by the press rather than the SEC);
Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (arguing that financial penalties imposed
by courts for misconduct are far outweighed by the financial impact of reputational losses
suffered because of the misconduct).
208. Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7,
S7–S8, S16–S19 (1993) (arguing that the adaptability of Rule 10b-5 is a virtue “because we as a
culture have not yet created a consistent, persuasive story of what the business of investing is all
about”).
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been able to adapt to changes in attitude and to avoid deciding
certain difficult questions, thereby protecting the “crown jewel” of
securities regulation from the violence it might endure were it subject
209
to searching examination and revision.
Professor Langevoort has a point, but not a very uplifting one.
This field of law continues to bear more and more weight in both
financial regulation and public discourse, while avoiding scrutiny as to
what makes it worthy of such load bearing. How long can the illusion
that Rule 10b-5 really decides questions of fraud last, and why should
lawyers permit that illusion to persist? Saying that a legal regime is
effective in part because it successfully avoids taking a clear position
on what it is doing has more than a hint of circularity.
I began the discussion of fraud in Part I by pointing to three
competing demands that the law must manage: the need for
adaptability in the face of innovation, the requirements of adequate
notice and fairness that emanate from legality-related values, and the
need to preserve the concept of fraud as an idea that Americans use
to organize legal and public discourse about wrongdoing in financial
affairs and to sort out what has happened when markets go wrong.
Every time a market bubble bursts, or even strongly corrects, a
large class of losers inevitably claim to be the victims of fraud because
they have lost heavily after believing things that turned out to be
false. The more harm done, the more these victims also become angry
with the sellers in the market for creating the bubble—especially if
many of the same sellers hedged themselves or exited the market
before the crash—and want to see them severely punished.
If the law gives most, or even many, of those harmed a cause of
action to recover their losses on the basis of fraud, if the law permits
imprisonment of such persons, and if prosecutors act primarily to
satisfy public appetites, the idea of fraud will gradually lose its
meaning. The end result could easily be that fraud is equated with
nothing more than legal outcomes or political power. Meanwhile, the
ability to identify instances of seriously culpable wrongdoing from
among the great mass of all market failings would be lost. To
condemn everyone is, ultimately, to condemn no one. This has long

209. Id. at S19 (discussing the reasons that Rule 10b-5 is unlikely to be revised, such as a
“fear of opening up the enforcement ‘crown jewel’ of securities regulation to the vagaries and
special interests of the political process” (footnote omitted)).
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been a worry within particular areas of the criminal law. And
depletion of criminal law’s moral authority is even more concerning
211
in areas of law that bridge criminal and civil liability.
If one cares about preserving the expressive force of the concept
of fraud, one should want to reserve fraud doctrine for serious
wrongs. That might include limiting liability for securities fraud to
cases of purposeful deception or its near equivalent. At the least, one
should want to insist on clarity about what the law means when it
talks about fraud.
C. Reform Angles
To complete this Article, I sketch two angles, which are not
mutually exclusive, for reforming the law of securities fraud in service
of the agenda advocated in the previous Parts.
1. Amend the Statutes and Rules. Much of my argument has been
directed at the need for a more explicit discussion of the purposes of
Rule 10b-5 and related aspects of securities regulation and of the
question of what types of fraud and misrepresentation ought to be
sanctioned. Suppose for a moment that the discussion ended up at
more or less the status quo: The law of securities fraud ought to
sanction both core fraud and misleading statements and conduct
committed with gross negligence or even simple negligence. And it
should include both civil and criminal penalties.
Reform would still be in order, so that securities law could be
much clearer about what forms of fraud and misrepresentation it
means to sanction and why, about what form of conduct it is
sanctioning in any particular instance, and about why the particular
form of sanction chosen fits the conduct in a given case. Even in
litigation environments in which settlement is the overwhelming
210. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 431 (1958) (“What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal
prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first place? What sense does it
make to prohibit ex post facto laws (to take the one explicit guarantee of the Federal
Constitution on the substantive side) if a man can, in any event, be convicted of an infamous
crime for inadvertent violation of a prior law of the existence of which he had no reason to
know and which he had no reason to believe he was violating, even if he had known of its
existence?”).
211. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 200 (1991) (“[T]he
criminal sanction is increasingly being used by regulators as a preferred enforcement tool
without regard to the traditional limitations on its use.”).
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norm, such changes would discipline the pleading and settlement
processes in ways that would channel case selection and improve the
clarity of deterrent and educative messages.
Some simple redrafting could go a long way in this regard. One
might reorganize both Section 17 of the ’33 Act and Rule 10b-5 into
separate provisions: one for core fraud, using something like the “any
scheme to defraud” language, and one for misrepresentations, using
language like “misrepresentation or conduct or omission that
misleads.” Thereafter, the law would provide causes of action for
“securities fraud” as well as causes of actions for “misrepresentation
in securities transactions.”
Next, one might add language specifying the levels of mental
state or fault applicable to each cause of action. The statutes and rules
should state that liability for securities fraud attaches only upon proof
of a purpose to deceive. Depending on the degree to which normative
considerations counsel for or against crush-out liability for
misstatements in securities markets, liability for misrepresentations
would attach upon proof of recklessness, explicitly defined in either
the conscious-disregard or super-negligence sense; negligence; or
even no-fault, strict liability. If liability were permitted for simple
negligence or for faultless violations, one might consider calling the
cause of action “disclosure failure” rather than “fraud” or
212
“misrepresentation.” Further distinctions at the sanctioning stage—
guidelines for the amount of fines, for example—would be advisable
to achieve the desired levels of deterrence of intentional fraud versus
deterrence of misrepresentations committed recklessly or with even
less fault. Such distinctions would also create a clear system of graded
213
and escalating sanctions for more serious violations.

212. Whether—or how—the D&O insurance market might adjust, if at all, were the law of
securities fraud to clearly distinguish cases of intentional fraud from cases of careless
misrepresentation is an interesting question, but that question is beyond the scope of this
Article.
213. The single comprehensive redrafting exercise since adoption of the securities laws—the
American Law Institute’s proposal of a never-adopted Federal Securities Code—did not suggest
changing the existing law by dividing fraud and misrepresentation or distinguishing among
levels of awareness. See FED. SEC. CODE §§ 202(61), 202(86), 202(96), 202(147), 1602, 1604
(Proposed Official Draft 1978). A House bill preceding enactment of the PSLRA did propose
that in private lawsuits, securities fraud could only be established with proof of both intent to
deceive and knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to falsity, which was explicitly defined in the
gross-negligence sense. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (as passed by House, Mar. 10, 1995). The
proposal was not enacted.
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Finally, criminal liability would attach only for core fraud, not for
misrepresentation, and the “willful[ness]” requirement for criminal
penalties would be defined. The government might be required to
prove that a defendant acted not just with the specific intent to
214
defraud but also with awareness that her conduct was wrongful.
Provided that this mens rea requirement is satisfied, the law might
also specify that she could be criminally liable for acting with willful
blindness or a conscious disregard of a substantial risk that her
representations were false or that her conduct or omission was
misleading.
As straightforward as such a drafting exercise might be for
lawyers, it would face severe political obstacles. The battle over the
PSLRA was one of the great lobbying and legislative clashes of the
215
Clinton administration. And that legislation did almost nothing with
regard to the substantive liability standards involved in securities
fraud. Indeed, one suggestion to change the underlying law was
216
rejected because agreement was thought to be impossible. Talk of
legislation to respond to one of the Supreme Court’s most recent
decisions on the substantive law of securities fraud also has gone
217
nowhere.

214. See Beveridge, supra note 28, at 47 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court had, just months
before passage of the 1934 Act, held that when the word ‘willful’ is used in a penal statute, it
generally means an act done with a ‘bad purpose,’ not merely an act which is knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.”).
215. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 335 (1995) (“On December
22, 1995, the U.S. Senate voted to override President Clinton’s veto of [the PSLRA], concluding
a long and often rancorous legislative effort to bring about a sweeping revision of both
substantive and procedural law governing private actions under the federal securities laws.”);
Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private
Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 413 (2005)
(“Notwithstanding debate, controversy, and a presidential veto, the United States Congress
enacted [the PLSRA] in December of 1995.”).
216. See Avery, supra note 215, at 337 (“Congress appears studiously to have avoided the
question of whether recklessness is sufficient for private liability under the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”).
217. See 156 CONG. REC. S3569, S3618 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (introducing legislation
amending the ’34 Act to allow private actions against aiders and abettors); see also 156 CONG.
REC. S3663, S3670 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (discussing the reasons for amending the ’34 Act);
156 CONG. REC. S3385, S3399–S3400 (daily ed. May 7, 2010) (same). Congress did not pass the
proposal, instead directing “a study on the impact of authorizing a private right of action against
any person who aids or abets another person in violation of the securities laws.” Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929Z, 124 Stat. 1376,
1871 (2010).
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It might seem politically fraught to reopen a discussion on first
principles that has been largely dormant since SEC Commissioner
Sumner Pike famously declared seventy years ago: “[W]e are against
218
fraud, aren’t we?” But perhaps inertia can be overcome. A settling
academic consensus argues that the fraud-on-the-market class action
lawsuit under Rule 10b-5 is, at least in its current form,
219
unjustifiable. This relatively recent trend highlights an instability in
the law of securities fraud that can only increase and that this Article
has sought to expose further.
2. Repair the Doctrine in the Courts. Federal courts have
exceptional latitude with the law of securities fraud. Even given the
increasing skepticism in the political arena about judge-made law, the
role of the courts in gap-filling the law of securities fraud is so well
accepted as to be a ready vehicle for reforming that law. Absent
congressional intervention in the law of securities fraud, courts cannot
avoid their role as authors of the law. Perhaps matters would be
improved if judges were somewhat more candid about that role.
Four relatively simple steps on the road to reform are readily
available to the judiciary. First, the courts should stop talking about
securities fraud as if it were one thing. Rule 10b-5 and Section 17 each
plainly cover both core fraud and other forms of misrepresentation
and misleading conduct. When discussing securities cases, whether
civil or criminal, courts should require precision in the moving party’s
theory about what types of conduct are alleged to have violated the
law. Developing a practice of talking about “securities fraud” and
“misrepresentation in connection with securities transactions” as two
separate things would require only a small further step. And such a
practice would communicate more clearly to the public what exactly
is being sanctioned by the state under the label “securities fraud.”
There is concededly an argument for recklessness coexisting with
a core conception of fraud. If an actor intends to deceive and, in
furtherance of that goal, makes a conscious choice to disregard a
substantial risk that what she is saying is false or that what she is
doing is likely to deceive, she may be just as blameworthy as the
purposeful actor who has full knowledge of her representation’s
218. 5B JACOBS, supra note 85, § 6:3, at 6-10 (quoting Milton Freeman, Administrative
Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market 5 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-17, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1824324.
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falsity. The speaker who chooses to make a representation knowing it
may be false has something equivalent to knowledge of falsity: she
knows that she does not have the confidence in what she is saying that
220
her assertion implies.
But the law of private liability for securities fraud has not even
attempted to engage with this argument. Federal courts—especially
the Supreme Court—have badly elided distinctions among intent,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, as well as between an
actor’s goals and her state of mind with respect to the tendency of her
words or conduct to mislead. The result is that the private right of
action under Rule 10b-5 has become both an action for sanctioning—
through heavy class action damages—intentional deceivers in the
securities markets and for compensating persons who have suffered
loss as a result of being misled through others’ gross carelessness.
Second, the courts should be clearer about mental state and
fault. The rule and statutes are essentially silent on the matter. The
concept of fraud and the nature of the underlying wrongdoing
involved in securities cases pivot on the state of mind with which the
violator acts. The matter of an actor’s purpose—her specific intent to
defraud—should be clearly distinguished from the matter of her
degree of fault with respect to the falsity of her representation or the
tendency of her conduct or omission to mislead. Judges should stop
talking about scienter, intent to defraud, and recklessness as if these
mental-state concepts can substitute for each other.
Third, on the matter of an actor’s awareness or fault with regard
to the falsity of her statement or the tendency of her conduct or
omission to mislead, courts should clearly distinguish negligence from
recklessness. Within recklessness, courts should also distinguish
between conscious disregard of a risk of falsity versus extreme lack of
care with regard to falsity. Although the law may be justified in
treating varying knowledge states as producing the same legal
consequences, judges should also clearly distinguish three knowledge

220. Cf. United States v. Sheiner, 273 F. Supp. 977, 982–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“If the
defendants’ acts were done inadvertently, mistakenly, or in good faith without an intention to
defraud, then . . . the defendants must be acquitted. . . . On the other hand, if the defendants
acted wilfully and purposely with an evil intent, or with a reckless indifference to the truth, then
they are chargeable with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent.” (emphasis added)), aff’d,
410 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1969). A poor argument, however, is to say, in a bootstrap maneuver, that
“one who acts with reckless indifference to whether a representation is true or false is
chargeable with knowledge of its falsity.” United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.
1979).
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states from each other: actual awareness of falsity, willful blindness as
to falsity, and conscious-disregard of a substantial risk of falsity.
Above all, criminal fraudulent intent should be distinguished from
forms of scienter that are deemed sufficient for civil liability.
Fourth, courts should do more work to clarify the conditions in
which nondisclosure and conduct can support liability for securities
fraud. And they should draw a tighter connection between the axes of
conduct and context and the axis of fault. The conclusion might well
be that, even in a relationship in which certain conduct or omissions
are deceptive, securities fraud liability for such conduct or such
omissions requires a purpose to deceive and cannot be imposed when
an actor simply behaves negligently or recklessly.
CONCLUSION
For all the discussions of the instrumental effects of liability for
securities fraud—and even of related, subsidiary questions about the
doctrine surrounding reliance, loss causation, and fraud on the
market—we have neglected the matter at the core: the wrong of fraud
itself. The chief doctrinal question is the matter of mental state and
fault or, as the field terms it, scienter. But the real questions are what
fraud is as a concept and which conception of fraud the world’s most
powerful body of antifraud law is pursuing. Neglect of the conceptual
choices underlying fraud is far from the only problem in the field of
securities fraud, but it is exceedingly important.
Sustained attention to this matter promises to deliver three
things that would make the law of securities fraud a better public
servant: clarity about whether the mission of the securities fraud
liability regime is to deter cheating in the markets or, much more
broadly, to ensure accuracy in disclosure; ability better to warn those
who may land in prison for this kind of conduct and to explain why
those who land there belong there; and power to answer more
decisively prominent public questions about what has been done by
whom when firms and markets go badly awry.

